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Copyright infringement is said to be socially costly because it robs owners of due 
recompense and depresses incentives for creative production. This Article contends 
that in order to achieve copyright’s goal of maximizing cultural production, this 
dominant story of infringement’s costs requires alongside it a counter-story 
identifying the rare but important instances where copyright infringement enhances 
social welfare. Part I explains the need for an account of the novel notion of efficient 
copyright infringement. Other types of unlawful conduct may also be beneficial, but 
copyright in particular warrants exploration of efficient infringement because 
maximizing creative production requires some level of unauthorized use, and 
because copyright’s political economy tilts in favor of expanding owners’ rights. 
Part II explores efficient copyright infringement’s domain, showing that 
unauthorized use of protected works of authorship will be prosocial where traditional 
private ordering is unavailable (or strongly undesirable) to facilitate a given use, and 
where that use is welfare-enhancing. Part III outlines broadly how a law of efficient 
copyright infringement might look. It first explains how the Copyright Act has failed 
to fully account for beneficial unauthorized use. It then considers a variety of ways 
that copyright damages could be structured to better accommodate efficient 
infringement. The Article concludes by situating this argument in the context of a 
growing literature that explores the surprising and underappreciated upside of 
unauthorized use of copyrighted works of authorship. 
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Waisman, as well as workshop participants at the UC Hastings advanced IP seminar, 
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INTRODUCTION: COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
 Transgression is supposed to cause bad outcomes. Countless 
morality tales remind us that those who ignore flout wisely established 
social norms tend to meet unhappy fates.2 And this is especially true of 
transgressing legal boundaries. After all, while the state regulates 
conduct for many reasons, primary among them is to deter and 
sanction socially costly behavior. And usually, breaking the law does 
make the world a worse place. Entering someone else’s real property 
without permission affronts their sense of ownership and security, and 
can bring civil and criminal sanctions down on the trespasser. Murder 
ends lives, brings tragedy to survivors, and lands perpetrators on death 
row. The same holds true of private law, where breaching contracts 
betrays expectations, undermines the stability of commercial 
arrangements, and leads to litigation and liability.  
 
 But law’s broadly drawn categories cannot account for the 
myriad variations of human behavior. Hence transgressing law’s 
boundaries can, despite moral instincts to the contrary, cause net 
positive outcomes. Trespassing on land in order to avert a catastrophe 
or to engage in political protest will likely produce social benefits well 
in excess of any harm to the landowner. Killing a remorseless 
psychopath who is going to slaughter innocent civilians may do more 
good than harm. And promisors may find it more cost-effective to 
breach a contract and pay damages than to fully perform. These 
counterexamples may be anomalous, but they still illustrate that at 
least on rare occasions, engaging in otherwise illicit conduct may 
actually make the world a better place. 
  
 Copyright law follows along these lines. According to the 
official story, the interests of copyright owners and society exist in a 
cosmic alignment. Authors enjoy incentives to create thanks to 
exclusive rights in their works of authorship, and the public gets to 
enjoy the fruits of the resulting creative labors. Infringement, the 
official story goes, disrupts this symbiosis. Infringement harms owners 
because it robs them of their ability to extract value from their works 
of authorship. Infringement also harms society because it depresses 
incentives to own and acquire works, leading to less creative 
                                                
2 The Boy Who Cried Wolf furnishes a well-known example. If you lie enough 
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production and an impoverished cultural environment for us all. This 
leads to the notion that strict enforcement of infringement solves both 
of these problems.  Heavy copyright damages make sure copyright 
owners get their due, and also make sure society enjoys the continued 
progress of science that is the constitutional telos of the copyright 
system. In copyright, James Madison nicely summed up, “the public 
good fully coincides with the claims of individuals.”3 
 
 The surface appeal of this sanguine account, though, masks a 
much more complex reality. In a nontrivial number of instances, 
violating copyright law—like violating other laws—can serve socially 
beneficial ends. The exposure of a company’s fraudulent practices 
may necessarily entail unauthorized publication of their copyright-
protected internal communications. Infringement may also lead to 
public dissemination of culturally enriching materials kept under 
wraps by owners who want to suppress their dissemination. Outsider 
artists may trade on the illegality of their appropriation of others’ 
works as a constituent feature of their own creation, requiring 
infringement to create their work. Infringement also creates social 
welfare where it simply enables beneficial uses that wouldn’t have 
happened otherwise, such as where the mere act of acquiring 
permission for a use proves prohibitively costly in comparison its 
internalized value. And even owners may benefit from unauthorized 
copying of their works, such as where the copies serve as a powerful 
advertisement for the owner’s brand. 
 
 Law generally seeks to negotiate the rare but important 
occasions on which otherwise prohibited behavior produces social 
value. Courts have carved out exceptions to trespass law in the interest 
of avoiding catastrophe or death, preserving health, or encouraging 
democratic debate.4 Killing in order to save one’s own life, or that of 
third parties, is subject to a full affirmative defense in all American 
                                                
3 James Madison, THE FEDERALIST No. 43. 
4 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980) (holding that 
affirmative speech rights under the California Constitution allowed individuals to 
demonstrate peacefully in private areas open to the public); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 
369 (N.J. 1971) (dismissing trespass suit against defendants who entered private 
property without permission in order to provide migrant workers health-care and 
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jurisdictions, albeit under divergent circumstances.5 And contract law 
typically limits recovery to expectation damages in cases of 
nonperformance in order to avoid overcompensating promisees—
thereby encouraging “efficient breach”.6 Law has exhibited mixed 
responses to beneficial transgression. Property law generally allows 
trespass to save lives, but expresses mixed results when it comes to 
limiting the right to exclude in the interest of promoting other values.7 
States’ standards for reasonable self- or other-defense vary widely.8 
And recent work has cast doubt on the wisdom of contract law’s 
efficient breach doctrine, suggesting that it may underestimate the 
social costs of weakening promisees’ ability to rely on agreements.9 
 
 Copyright’s notion of beneficial wrongdoing—what I call 
“efficient copyright infringement”—is similarly conflicted. Some 
authors have touched on the possibility that unauthorized uses of 
protected works of authorship can create social welfare. Jessica 
Litman’s work on personal use has highlighted the extent to which 
formally infringing acts can generate small but meaningful social 
welfare gains.10 Rebecca Tushnet has outlined the numerous ways that 
verbatim copying can facilitate self-expression.11 Sonia Katyal and 
Eduardo Penalver’s recent discussion of “altlaws” catalogued some of 
the ways that infringing conduct can produce social benefits.12 But no 
work as yet has articulated a fully theorized and conceptually unified 
account of efficient copyright infringement, or explored how such a 
notion should be realized in positive law. 
                                                
5 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law sec. 5.7(a), at 454 (2d 
ed. 1986). 
6 See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 
1985) (Posner, J.) (vacating district court enforcement of liquidated damages clause 
in a services contract and remanding for remedy based on efficient breach theory).  
7 See Ben DePoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090 (describing 
variance in exceptions to right to exclude). 
8 Am. Jur. Homicide sec. 134 (cataloguing different state approaches to killing 
in self-defense). 
9 Cf., e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 
YALE L.J. 568 (2006-07) (articulating an alternative to the efficient breach approach 
that would allow promisees the option to choose between performance and breach 
with disgorgement of promisor’s profits). 
10 Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007). 
11 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). 
12 SONIA KATYAL & EDUARDO PENALVER, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW 
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 Given that infringement’s welfare-enhancing possibilities 
remain undertheorized, it is unsurprising that the Copyright Act itself 
also lacks a coherent doctrinal account of efficient copyright 
infringement. The fair use doctrine valiantly attempts a start at 
protecting unauthorized but socially beneficial uses, and other aspects 
of the copyright statute provide targeted protections that often apply to 
limited classes of users, such as its safe harbors for certain kinds of 
reproductions by libraries.13 But as I explain in more detail below,14 
these doctrines still leave wide swaths of productive but unauthorized 
use open to infringement liability. The mismatch between the 
Copyright Act and the idea of efficient infringement works to the 
detriment of owners as well as users. It means not only that law 
subjects many productive uses to outsized penalties, but also that it 
may undercompensate owners by allowing well capitalized users to 
extract value from protected works without having to pay a dime. 
 
 The absence of a unified account of efficient infringement is all 
the more troubling because copyright, more than other areas of private 
law, produces relatively more positive spillovers that redound to the 
public’s benefit.15 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed, the 
Copyright Act may make owners richer, but that is only a means to its 
true constitutional end of creating a culturally richer society.16 Crafting 
a regime of efficient copyright infringement will safeguard the kinds 
of uses that generate the most positive externalities for the public, at 
least insofar as they can or should not be acquired via traditional 
licensing. Articulating a prominent notion of efficient copyright 
infringement also serves the important political and rhetorical function 
of cutting back against the popular theme that all infringement is 
intrinsically wrongful, restoring balance to a Copyright Act that 
increasingly tilts in favors of owners and content industries. 
 
                                                
13 17 U.S.C. sec. 108. 
14 See Part III.A, “The Well Meaning Failures of the Copyright Act,” infra. 
15 See Brett Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 
(discussing positive externalities—spillovers—as a common and desirable feature of 
intellectual property systems, rather than problems in need of a solution). 
16 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor 
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a 
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 This Article elaborates efficient copyright infringement in 
three steps. Part I describes the domain of efficient copyright 
infringement, first explaining why copyright demands an account of 
efficient infringement, and then providing a parsimonious definition of 
the term. Part II develops the notion of efficient copyright 
infringement in more detail. It outlines copyright infringement’s 
capacity to create costs and benefits that are social and private, static 
and dynamic. It then develops a taxonomy of circumstances under 
which private ordering is either an unavailable or strongly undesirable 
means of facilitating uses of works of authorship. Part III examines the 
Copyright Act through the lens of the efficient copyright infringement 
paradigm. This Part first explains why the Act does not fully account 
for welfare-enhancing unauthorized use. It then broadly sketches some 
doctrinal innovations that could ameliorate this problem, including a 
novel approach to compulsory licenses that calibrates the amount of 
the license to the value generated by a use. Finally, the Conclusion 
places efficient copyright infringement in broader context, linking it to 
an emerging literature that is beginning to explore the 
underappreciated upside of copying, and the foundational implications 
copying’s upside may have for using traditional property strategies to 
encourage creative production. 
  
I. JUSTIFYING EFFICIENT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 
 It initially seems puzzling that copyright would require a 
category of efficient infringement.17 We don’t, by contrast, subject the 
enforcement of rights in physical property to a cost-benefit analysis. If 
I have an extra iPhone that is sitting in my desk drawer gathering dust, 
and you desperately want and need an iPhone but can’t afford it, law 
doesn’t entitle you to take it, even though there’s a pretty good 
argument that such a transfer would be socially beneficial. Instead, 
private property—physical and intellectual—tends to be governed by 
in rem rules of exclusion. These rules say that with respect to a 
particular thing (the res), owners get to exclude just about anyone they 
                                                
17 I use “efficiency” here to refer broadly to the maximization of social welfare 
(hence more or less interchangeably with “welfare-enhancing”). The notion of 
efficiency in the copyright setting can be refined somewhat to refer to the 
maximization of social welfare via creative production. For a good overview—and 
critique—of different formulations of the term “efficiency,” see Gary Lawson, 
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want, on just about any terms they want, regardless of whether a 
reasonable person would think the owner is putting their property to 
the highest value use.18 
 
 Examined more closely, though, the differences between 
physical and intellectual property illuminate why copyright not only 
permits, but demands, an account of efficient infringement. Private 
physical property has public-regarding dimensions,19 but exists largely 
in order to enable owners to internalize as much value as possible from 
the things they own.20 Strong rights to exclude facilitate this dynamic 
by preserving owners’ expectations, thereby encouraging investment, 
and also by preventing overexploitation and depletion of scarce 
resources. Copyright’s goal, by contrast, is not the accretion of private 
wealth but the encouragement of cultural production.21 Its exclusive 
rights exist as a means to this end, and have to be carefully calibrated 
in order to maximize cultural production.22 Too little protection will 
mean that owners lack sufficient incentives to continue creating or 
acquiring future works. Too much protection means that there will not 
                                                
18 See Henry Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for 
Delineating Property, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 454-55 (2002) (comparing exclusion 
and governance strategies for managing property). Physical property owners’ rights 
are far from absolute. Doctrines like adverse possession (for real property) and 
accession (chattels) provide for title transfer to beneficial users under certain 
narrowly drawn conditions. 
19 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Property: Correcting the Half-Truths, PLAN. & 
ENVTL. L., Dec. 10, 2007, at 3, 7 (observing the public/private character of property 
entitlements).  
20 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347 (1967) (arguing that property rights emerge in order to 
allow owners to internalize as much value as possible from the exploitation of their 
res). 
21 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The 
copyright law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.”). 
22 WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 71-84 (2003) (formally modeling the cost/benefit 
structure of copyright’s incentive system); Matthew Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The 
Law and Economics of Copyright Scope and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 
187, 198-217 (2006) (discussing the impacts on creative production of changes in 
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be enough breathing space to enable the kind of distributed 
collaboration over time that is the lifeblood of social creativity.23 
 
 The hard question, of course, is at what level ownership rights 
in works of authorship must be calibrated to encourage the optimal 
level of cultural production. The answer to this empirical question lies 
well beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, it has eluded scholars to 
date.24 We can be confident, though, that law’s attempts to effect this 
calibration are far from perfect. The Copyright Act offers a one-size-
fits-all scheme, rather than extending protection only where it is 
prosocial. Yet this imperfection is part of the design of the copyright 
system, rather than something to be suppressed. Intellectual property is 
designed in large part to produce socially positive externalities, rather 
than to enable complete internalization of the value generated by 
works of authorship or inventions.25 Moreover, the inevitable 
imperfection of calibrating copyright at a level that maximizes cultural 
production means that some unauthorized use will always be 
necessary to achieve the optimal level of creativity.26  
 
 This is where efficient copyright infringement comes in. Since 
copyright is a state-created system designed to create artificial scarcity 
in order to incentivize cultural production,27 the contours of that 
system require constant adjustment in order to make sure it achieves 
                                                
23 Jonathan Barnett, What’s So Bad About Stealing?, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 21 
(characterizing creative production as “a cumulative process consisting of an 
unfolding sequence of first-mover and n-mover creations”). 
24 The most exhaustive study to date on whether the current level of copyright 
protection maximizes cultural production returned indeterminate results. Raymond 
Ku, et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of 
Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669 (2009).  
25 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 15 (observing that the leakiness of IP 
rights is a crucial part of their capacity to create social welfare).  
26 Barnett, supra note 23 at 22 (“Some positive level of tolerated theft is an 
essential component of any transaction structure that maximizes the social wealth 
generated by creative production.”). 
27 Dan Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First 
Principles 7, UC Irvine School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-60, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2113975 (“The 
intellectual property right … places a legal fence around goods that cannot 
physically be fenced off. In economic terms, it gives the owner of the intellectual 
property market power: the ability to raise prices and restrict output—in this case, 
above the marginal distribution cost of a public good. Market power is associated 
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its desired end. Efficient copyright infringement facilitates this in two 
ways. Substantively, it creates space for flexibility within copyright 
law itself, so that enforcement of owners’ rights can be aligned more 
accurately with copyright’s social purpose. And symbolically, it serves 
as a reminder that strict enforcement of owners’ copyrights is not an 
unalloyed good, but merely one possible option in a complex 
conversation about how best to maximize cultural production. 
 
Framing this discussion in terms of efficient copyright 
infringement, though, loads the conversation in the direction of users’, 
rather than owners’, prerogatives. One might reasonably wonder why 
the aforementioned need to constantly recalibrate the balance between 
private rights and the public domain requires attention only to the 
possible efficiency of unauthorized use, rather than authorized use that 
might be better off privatized. This is a plausible rejoinder. It is 
entirely possible that some aspects of fair use, for example, 
underprotect owners in a socially counterproductive way. Although 
this Article addresses the problem of owners’ undercompensation to 
some extent below,28 full examination of that issue is not possible in 
this space. And there are at least two reasons to think that solicitude 
for unauthorized use, rather than underdevelopment of owners’ rights, 
warrants particular concern. 
 
First, the distinctive political economy of intellectual property 
gives us reason to suspect that private rights in information trend in 
favor of owners at the expense of users. Copyright is particularly 
vulnerable to capture by the content industries that are its primary 
beneficiaries. Those industries, which own numerous copyrights and 
benefit disproportionately from stronger exclusive rights, have an 
obvious incentive to lobby for rent-seeking legislation.29 That 
copyright is exclusively a feature of federal law makes this task easier, 
since its reform requires only a single legislative change (rather than 
the coordinated efforts of fifty state legislatures). This effect is 
compounded by copyright’s statutory character, since it is not subject 
                                                
28 See Part III.B, infra. 
29 Cf., e.g., LARRY LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 229-34 (2004) 
(describing the legislative process leading to the passage of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 as a classic example of “rent-seeking” legislation—a law 
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to the forced gradualism of common law processes.30 And copyright’s 
relative novelty means that it lies unmoored from the moral instincts 
that have accompanied the historical development of other property 
law, so that public backlash against even radical change is less 
likely.31 As a result, the history of copyright reform has been written 
largely by content owners who wanted to extract more value from 
their works. Noah Webster successfully lobbied Congress for the first 
copyright term extension in 1831 (the bill for which was introduced by 
Webster’s son-in-law, William Ellsworth).32 The earliest version of the 
derivative right was established to protect Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 
right to own translations of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.33 And the twenty-year 
extension of copyright terms in 1998 (which no member of Congress 
opposed) was supported by a conglomerate of major content industry 
players, spearheaded by Disney.34 Indeed, all the major copyright laws 
passed in the past forty years have been expansions of owners’ 
rights.35 As copyright trends in a more expansive direction, the 
likelihood that unauthorized uses may be formally infringing but still 
socially beneficial grows ever greater. 
 
The second reason that warrants particular concern for users’ 
rights looks to legal precommitments governing copyright regulation 
                                                
30 See Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 178 
(describing the features and possible advantages of common-law minimalism). 
31 The Copyright Term Extension Act and Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
were both passed in 1998 with little resistance, even though they represented 
massive changes to the landscape of information regulation. The public slowly grew 
aware of the implications of both Acts, though, and responded with increased 
attention to future revisions to copyright law. Some expansions of copyright have 
taken place with little public resistance, such as the Family Entertainment and 
Copyright Act of 2005, while others have met with outrage, such as the Stop Online 
Piracy Act of 2012.  
32 The 1831 Act extended the initial term of copyright from fourteen to twenty-
eight years. Thomas Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 The Green 
Bag 2d 37, 39 (2002). 
33 Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209 (1983) (describing the genesis of today’s adaptation 
right in the nineteenth-century controversy over Stowe’s unsuccessful attempt to 
bring an infringement lawsuit regarding an unauthorized German translation of her 
novel). 
34 See LESSIG, supra note 29 at 229-34. 
35 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 35-63 (2001) (cataloguing the owner-friendly copyright 
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rather than political reasons to suspect that the extant rights 
overprotect works. As we have seen, copyright, in contrast to physical 
property, does not have as its ultimate end the production of value for 
owners. Rather, it is animated by the goal articulated in the 
Constitution’s Progress Clause: to create exclusive rights in authors 
for limited times in order to “promote the progress of science.”36 The 
Supreme Court has emphasized that copyright’s exclusive rights may 
make owners richer, but that this is simply a means to the system’s 
ultimate end of creating a culturally rich society and a well-informed 
citizenry.37 The Progress Clause is sometimes described as a mere 
preambular aspiration,38 this dismissal understates the nature of its 
authority. The Clause describes not only a general ideal, but an 
enforceable, limiting principle that is part of the Constitution’s 
establishment of a government of limited powers.39 Congress may not 
create intellectual property laws unless those laws “promote the 
Progress of Science.”40 This legal obligation reminds us of the 
important proposition that strict enforcement of the copyright laws 
may not serve the interests of society, and indeed may not even be 
permissible as a matter of law, if it represents a surfeit of private rights 
in information at the expense of public access to cultural goods. 
 
*  *  * 
                                                
36 U.S. Const. art. I, cl. 8, sec. 8; Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) 
(“The sole interest of the United States . . . in conferring [a copyright] lie[s] in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the Labors of authors.”). 
37 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, (1975) (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ 
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.”). 
38 E.g., Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (“[W]e cannot accept appellants’ 
argument that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit 
on congressional power.”). 
39 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 
(describing the Progress Clause as an “express limitation” on congressional power). 
Later Supreme Court cases implicitly accepted the proposition that the Progress 
Clause did effect a substantive limitation on congressional power, e.g., Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), even though 
the Court ultimately did not invalidate legislation as beyond the boundaries 
prescribed by the Clause. 
40 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The 
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by 
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Copyright is a form of property, albeit a peculiar one. This 
distinctiveness explains the need for a notion, and a doctrine, of 
efficient copyright infringement. Copyright’s ultimate aspiration is not 
to make owners richer, but to make society richer through maximizing 
cultural production. The sweeping generality with which law must 
operate means that, however much it would disappoint James 
Madison, exclusive rights cannot be perfectly calibrated to assure that 
in every instance owners’ incentives match perfectly with society’s 
best interests. Efficient copyright infringement seeks to counter this 
slippage, which typically (though by no means always) comes in the 
form of overprotection of owner’s rights. Hence reaching the maximal 
level of cultural production requires not only a narrative about owners’ 
copyrights and enforcing them, but also one about the circumstances 
under which violating those rights may be the best way to achieve the 
copyright system’s constitutional goals. 
 
II. EFFICIENT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT’S DOMAIN 
 
Part I justified the need for an account of efficient copyright 
infringement. Part II seeks to develop that account, first by discussing 
the notion of efficient copyright infringement in complete but 
parsimonious terms.41  It first establishes a general model of what 
efficient copyright infringement is, using contract law’s notion of 
efficient breach as a starting point. It then disaggregates this model 
into its two constituent elements—welfare-enhancing use and flawed 
private ordering—and constructs a taxonomy that elaborates each of 
these elements in more detail. 
 
A. Efficient Copyright Infringement: General Principles 
 
Efficient transgression is no stranger to the law. Contract, for 
example, has a robustly developed notion of efficient breach.42 Its 
                                                
41 Cf. Henry Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 
1695 (“As with scientific theories in general, a property theory should aim to explain 
more facts with less machinery.”). Smith’s description of a theory may be closer to a 
model. See generally Emanuel Derman, Models. Behaving. Badly.: Why Confusing 
Illusion with Reality Can Lead to Disaster, on Wall Street and in Life (2012) 
(distinguishing models and theories).  
42 E.g., Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and 
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logic is simple and intuitive. If A promises B something by means of a 
written contract, and then A finds that it would be more profitable to 
breach and pay damages than to fully perform the contract,43 then 
breach is a better result than full performance. Such a breach puts A in 
a better position, and costs B nothing since expectation damages put B 
in the same position she would have been had A fully performed.44 
 
The structure of efficient breach in contract law maps 
imperfectly onto the domain of copyright for several reasons. First, 
while common law contract remedies limit promisees to expectation 
damages in case of breach, copyright’s remedies offer a wider array of 
options to owners who win infringement suits. Prevailing plaintiffs 
can opt for actual damages in the form of the costs of their breach or 
the profits earned by the infringer, whichever is greater. And where a 
work has been timely registered, plaintiffs can also opt for statutory 
damages, which entitle them to a flat-fee recovery regardless of the 
actual costs exacted by the infringement. Statutory damage awards lie 
within judicial discretion, but can range from $750 to $30,000 per 
infringing act, with a ceiling of $150,000 per act in cases of willful 
infringement.45 Copyright’s damages structure is thus designed to 
deter the very kind of opportunistic transgression that efficient breach 
                                                                                                               
obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his 
default after placing his promise in as good a position as he would have occupied 
had performance been rendered.”). Efficient breach is more a “notion” than a 
“doctrine” because it is really an idea that has been used to explain why common law 
contract doctrine does not permit exemplary or punitive damages. RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (propounding an efficient-breach explanation of 
contract law’s lack of such damages).  
43 This may be the case where, for example, a supplier who has promised to 
deliver goods gets a significantly more lucrative offer for the same goods. See 
POSNER, supra note 42 (outlining such an example). 
44 Courts have typically respected instances of efficient breach by limiting 
defendant-promisees’ remedies to expectation damages. E.g., Lake River Corp. v. 
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, efficient breach has 
its critics, some of whom argue that contract represents a moral obligation that 
should not be breached regardless of economic considerations, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1982), and 
others who argue that the efficient breach theory fails to maximize social welfare, 
e.g., Charles Calleros, Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses 
Penales in Contract Actions: A Comparative Analysis of the American Common Law 
and the French Civil Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 67, 87-88 (2006) (summarizing 
welfarist critiques of the efficient breach hypothesis). 
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encourages. An infringer who makes a $100 use of a work that was 
available for $10 will still be subject to an actual damages award of 
$90 (wiping out any profit), or statutory damages of at least $750 
(making the infringement a massively value-negative proposition). 
 
Second, efficient breach is closely tied to contract’s distinctive 
structure, where an initial, formal agreement between a promisor and a 
promisee leads to an executory period in which the promisee’s 
performance remains partial, culminating with some future moment in 
which performance has been completed. By contrast, copyright 
infringement possesses the structure of a simple property tort. The 
moment a user exercises without authorization one of the six exclusive 
rights an owner enjoys with respect to a copyrighted work of 
authorship, infringement has taken place, much as an act of trespass is 
perfected the moment a non-owner steps onto someone else’s real 
property without permission. The structure of copyright infringement, 
unlike contract performance, does not rely on a gap between the 
execution of an agreement and its ultimate completion. It is a moment 
in time, not a span within which the minds of parties or external 
circumstances can change. 
 
Efficient breach in contract—at least as it has been elaborated 
in the literature—aligns poorly with copyright also for a final reason. 
Contract’s efficient breach models typically assume a closed universe 
of relevant parties (promisor and promise) and sidelines the distributed 
social costs of such breaches.46 We could think about copyright 
infringement in these terms as well, where the costs of the 
unauthorized use affect only the owner and benefit only the infringer. 
But such a focus would too narrowly construe copyright’s aims. The 
ultimate end of maximizing cultural production means that a dialogue 
about the efficiency of copyright infringement has to take into account 
not only the private, but also the public costs and benefits of 
unauthorized use to an extent that is underappreciated in contract law’s 
efficient breach literature. 
 
But while efficient breach may not provide a neatly applicable 
doctrinal framework for modeling efficient copyright infringement, it 
                                                
46 E.g., Brooks, supra note 9; but see HENRY MATHER, CONTRACT LAW AND 
MORALITY 117-18 (1999) (discussing the harm efficient breach may cause to 
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is helpful insofar as it provides a similar basic principle. Some 
breaches of contract are efficient because they are Pareto superior to 
contract performance. That is, they make some parties (promisors) 
better off, and do so without causing any parties (even promisees) to 
end up worse off. Similarly, some infringements of copyright may 
certainly be efficient in the sense that they generate net social welfare. 
It’s possible that a Limewire user’s enjoyment of an illegally 
downloaded .mp3 is massive, and swamps the lost licensing revenue 
and associated costs of the infringement to the sound recording’s 
owner. But this outcome is only Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because the 
Limewire user’s gains come at the expense of the sound recording 
owner’s (marginal) losses. And there was, of course, a Pareto superior 
alternative: The user could have downloaded the sound recording 
instead legally from iTunes, and that way everyone wins.47 The sound 
recording and musical work owners get paid a royalty, and the user’s 
massive enjoyment of the track easily makes the $1 cost of the track 
well worth it to them.48 
 
 So why do we need efficient copyright infringement in a world 
where good old private ordering provides the best way to facilitate 
welfare-enhancing uses of copyrighted works? If private ordering 
always worked as in the above ideal example, then efficient 
infringement might be unnecessary. But as a practical matter, market 
mechanisms may fail to enable welfare-enhancing uses. Under such 
circumstances, standard assignment or licensing practices are 
unavailable, and it becomes necessary to consider how unauthorized 
use can fill in these gaps in order to maximize cultural production.  
  
 The foregoing leaves us with a two-part theory of efficient 
copyright infringement. To restate the above somewhat more formally, 
legally unauthorized use of copyrighted works49 is efficient where:  
                                                
47 See Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical 
Review of Richard Posner’s The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 
1106-07 (1982) (explaining and comparing Pareto superiority, Pareto optimality, and 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
48 Single iTunes tracks range from $.69 to $1.29 in the U.S. 
http://support.apple.com/kb/ht1711.  
49 This definition excludes the various uses listed in sections 107-122 of the 
Copyright Act. While these uses may not be privately authorized by owners, they are 
authorized by law, hence their definition as not-infringing. E.g., 17 U.S.C. sec. 107 
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(i) the sum of its social benefits is greater than the sum of its 
social costs, and  
 
(ii) acquisition of permission to use the work was unavailable or 
untenable via traditional private ordering. 
 
 The subsequent discussion elaborates each of these elements. 
Before moving on to that discussion, though, I pause to say a word 
about the welfarist idiom of this Article. Throughout, this Article 
speaks about copyright ownership and infringement solely in terms of 
social welfare. One might reasonably point out that this is by no means 
the only way to think about copyright’s function and purpose. Indeed, 
it is not: The notion of moral rights conceives of copyright from a 
deontic, rather than a welfarist, perspective.50 I limit my discussion to 
the latter, though, for several reasons. The first is necessity: The moral 
issues raised by intentional unauthorized use of copyrighted works are 
interesting, and complex, and for that reason simply beyond the scope 
of what is already a rather long full-length work. Second, in the 
discussion that ensues in Part II.B, I hope to capture—if imperfectly—
some of these concerns by considering more than just pure economic 
costs, but also dignitary harms, in analyzing the impacts of 
infringement on owners. And finally, the United States, in contrast to 
continental Europe and South America, explicitly adopts a welfarist 
approach to intellectual property. The Constitution, courts, and 
commentators alike tend to agree that the point of copyright is not to 
protect authors’ rights as a deontic matter, but to maximize creative 
production. This Article proceeds on that assumption, though it 
acknowledges the interesting perspective that a non-consequentialist 
approach to efficient copyright infringement could bring. 
 
B. Mapping Infringement’s Costs and Benefits 
 
This section considers the first of the two elements that 
constitute efficient copyright infringement: Whether an infringing act 
generates net benefits for social welfare. The moral instinct that 
                                                
50 For good overviews of the moral rights perspective on copyright, see 
ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR 
THE UNITED STATES (2010) and Lolly Gassaway, Copyright and Moral Rights, 6 
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transgression of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights is wrongful tends 
to make us think that bad effects flow from this conduct.51 But as the 
ensuing discussion shows, the real story of infringement is more 
complex. Unauthorized use may seem bad, but it can do good, not 
only for the user, but for the public and even for the owner of the 
infringed work. The scope of this discussion must remain modest. It is 
impossible to predict, ex ante, the net welfare effect of any conduct, 
including copyright infringement,52 and also to measure these effects 
with precision ex post. The goal of this Subpart, then, is not to suggest 
that infringement is always, or even usually, welfare-enhancing. 
Instead, it seeks only to provide a detailed framework that may prove 
helpful in thinking carefully about how infringement affects social 
welfare, and in turn provides a basis for thinking about how law might 
use filtering mechanisms to calibrate penalties to deter socially 
harmful infringement and distinguish it from socially beneficial 
infringement. 
 
Two dyads illuminate how unauthorized use of an owner’s 
work of authorship may generate social welfare or social costs. First, 
those costs and benefits may be private or public. Private costs and 
benefits are those that are internalized—that is, suffered (or enjoyed) 
entirely by the infringer and owner themselves. By contrast, public 
costs and benefits are those that are externalized—that is, not 
experienced by the infringer or owner themselves, but rather inflicted 
(or conferred) on third parties. Second, the costs and benefits of 
unauthorized use of copyrighted works of authorship may be static or 
dynamic.53 Static costs and benefits are those that lie directly in the 
                                                
51 See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE 
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2011) (reporting the results of numerous 
studies showing that people who have an instinctively negative moral reaction to 
conduct strongly assume that the conduct will have negative social effects as well, 
even where there is no evidence for the latter point). 
52 These kinds of predictive empirical claims about social welfare are always to 
some degree indeterminate. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just Compensation’ Law, 80 HARV. L. 
REV. 1165 (1967) (reflecting on the “inability of outside observers to appraise the 
efficiency of proposed social measures”). 
53 This discussion borrows from the distinction between static and dynamic 
efficiency in the economics literature. See, e.g., B.H. KLEIN, PRICES, WAGES, AND 
BUSINESS CYCLES: A DYNAMIC THEORY 46-50 (1984) (contrasting static efficiency, 
which is the optimal combination of inputs subject to the constraints imposed by a 
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causal chain begun by the infringing conduct, and are not interrupted 
by the decisionmaking processes of third parties. By contrast, dynamic 
costs and benefits are more causally remote from the initial 
infringement, and result from the way third parties’ conduct is affected 
by the infringement. Static costs and benefits typically include the 
very immediate effects of the consumption of a work, though they also 
include longer-term effects that directly result from it. Dynamic costs 
and benefits refer to the second-order systemic effects that infringing 
conduct causes when the infringement alter actors’ incentives to 
engage in creative production. The static/dynamic distinction is thus 
not the same as the distinction between temporally proximate and 
distal effects of infringement, though there is a rough correlation 
between the two. These two dyads—private and public, static and 
dynamic—provide a framework for constructing a model of the 
welfare effects of copyright infringement. 
 
  1. Infringement’s costs  
 
Imagine that A owns a copyrighted work of authorship, and B 
makes an unauthorized use of it. What are the social costs of this 
conduct? Foremost on A’s mind would likely be the infringement’s 
static, private costs: Namely, the lost revenue for licensing fees to 
which she was entitled.54 This is the very point of the copyright 
monopoly. The exclusive right enables owners to charge for different 
kinds of uses, so that unauthorized use inflicts harm on them even if it 
does not also deprive them of the res itself.55 But the story of the 
private, static costs of B’s conduct doesn’t always end there. 
Unauthorized use of someone’s work without their consent may not 
deprive A of property in the same sense that theft deprives an owner of 
their good, but it still may cause psychic harm associated with 
property transgression. Just as owners of real property may experience 
dignitary harm even in the event of an economically costless 
                                                                                                               
production function itself in profitable directions). See also LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 22 at 20-21 (discussing the dynamic effects of property systems). 
54 Alternatively, B might have simply acquired the work from A outright rather 
than just paid for the right to make a particular use, a practice that approximates a 
sale of chattel goods but is known in copyright parlance as assignment. 
55 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22 at 13-14 (discussing how intellectual 
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trespass,56 so may a copyright owner experience psychic costs when 
their work is used without consent.57 
 
 These static, private costs may translate, in the longer term, 
into dynamic, private costs. If the Bs of the world can use A’s work 
without her permission, A will start to think that she should seek a 
more profitable line of work.58 This is certainly true for authors whose 
primary motivation is pecuniary. But it may also be true of at least 
some authors who are motivated other than by money, even bloggers 
or amateur photographers. To the extent that unauthorized, and 
unattributed, use of one’s creative work can effect dignitary harm, this 
may lead even creators without profit motivations to find the 
experience of creation unpleasant, and possibly to give up the game.59 
And especially where unauthorized use is made for a profit, authors or 
owners may either feel like they have been taken advantage of,60 or 
could come to think of their work in a more pecuniary light.61 Either of 
these effects could lead authors and owners to decline to produce 
future works in the absence of secure exclusive rights. 
 
                                                
56 Cf., e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) 
(authorizing an award of exemplary damages for economically costless trespass as a 
means of compensating owners for dignitary harm).  
57 This is not to say that U.S. law protects the dignitary interests of owners, as 
moral rights regimes generally do. Indeed, most courts agree that it does not, see 
Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American 
copyright law … seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of 
authors.”). My assertion is merely that that owners themselves may well feel that 
unauthorized use affronts their dignity. See, e.g., email exchange with Kirsten (on 
file with author) (explaining that unauthorized use of her photography on the internet 
is a greater concern to her from a dignitary than an economic perspective). 
58 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 22 at 20 (“Unless there is power to exclude, 
the incentive to create intellectual property in the first place may be impaired.”). 
59 See Michelman, supra note 59 at 1180 (characterizing as “demoralization 
costs” the psychic costs of being deprived of property without compensation, as well 
as the losses in future production caused by the realization that future deprivations 
may occur). 
60 Cf. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. 
L. REV. 1003 (reporting results of a study showing that people are highly sensitive to 
the suspicion that they are being exploited). 
61 See Dan Ariely, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT 
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 75-82 (rev. ed. 2009) (showing that market motivations tend 
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Does B’s unauthorized use inflict any public costs as well? 
This is unlikely from a static perspective. The immediate, short term 
costs of B’s failure to pay due licensing fees—economic or personal—
are internalized entirely by A. B’s infringement may, though, give rise 
to dynamic public costs. As we have seen, B’s failure to pay a license 
to A may well depress A’s incentives to create, leading her to be at 
least marginally less likely to create future works. The dynamic costs 
of B’s unauthorized use come in the form of less creative production, 
and a concomitantly diminished cultural milieu in the aggregate. Table 
1 briefly summarizes the costs of B’s infringement: 
 
Table 1:  Costs of B’s infringement 
 
 Private Public 
Static Lost licensing revenue; 
dignitary harms 
Alternative losses to owners of 
reasonable substitutes for A’s work 
Dynamic Reduced incentives to 
create future works, for A 
and others 
Loss of future works that A would 
otherwise have created but for the 
infringement 
 
  2.  Infringement’s benefits  
 
The dominance of the standard narrative of copyright 
incentives makes much of the story of infringement’s costs familiar. 
The question of how infringement might create social value rather than 
harm remains less explored. The ensuing discussion lays the 
groundwork for that exploration by mapping in detail the potential 
benefits—social and public, static and dynamic—of unauthorized use. 
Of course, most of the ensuing benefits are not unique to unauthorized 
use. They would accrue as readily had B paid A for a license. But 
understanding in detail how any use—permitted or otherwise—
generates social welfare is useful for considering whether law should 
enable such uses when private ordering is unavailable.  
 
 The social welfare generated by B’s infringement of A’s work 
depends on the kind of use it is. Not all unauthorized uses are created 
equal. Some such uses have few social ripple effects, as where a 
Limewire user downloads a sound recording, listens to it once, and 
never thinks of it again. Other unauthorized uses have much greater 
social impacts, as where a remix DJ uses a series of unauthorized 
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brings joy to thousands of listeners and contributes to the development 
of music itself. Chris Sprigman has described the former category of 
uses as consumptive and the latter as productive,62 and this distinction 
helps illuminate the social benefits that flow from different kinds of 
unauthorized uses. Consumptive uses refer to those where the user 
consumes a work solely for its informational or aesthetic value, 
without making any follow-on use of it that might generate additional 
social value.63 Such purely consumptive uses are those we typically 
associate with consumer uses of works of authorship. If B’s use is of 
this character, such as downloading an unauthorized copy of a hit 
music track just to listen to it, then the story of the social welfare 
created by the use is simple, and brief. Certainly B gets private, static 
benefits out of the use: Aesthetic enjoyment, free of charge, plus any 
illumination that may grow out of it. But the private, dynamic benefits 
of the use are likely few, since B’s mere consumption of A’s work is 
unlikely to change B’s demand for or future consumption of creative 
works. And for related reasons, the public accrues few or no benefits, 
either static or dynamic, from B’s unauthorized and purely 
consumptive use, in light of the fact that the very nature of such a use 
is that it is predominantly private act of consumption. 
 
Consider, by contrast, the social implications that flow when 
B’s unlicensed use of A’s work is productive, not just consumptive. 
For example, B could use A’s work to make a creative and 
interesting—albeit unauthorized—derivative work of her own. If this 
is the case, then the social welfare calculus changes substantially. The 
static, private benefits to B remain roughly the same. She enjoys free 
use of A’s work as an input in her creative process. But if B’s use is 
productive, rather than merely consumptive, then additional, distal 
static benefits accrue. B may enjoy fame and esteem if the work is 
well-received. These private static benefits may spur private dynamic 
ones, stimulating more demand for B’s work, furthering her career, 
and enabling her production of future works. B may also enjoy 
dynamic benefits in the form of collaboration opportunities. 
 
                                                
62 Chris Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 317, 334-38 (2009) (defining and elaborating “consumptive” use). 
63 The value created by the use for its user is obviously a form of social value. 
My claim is not that consumptive use, even purely consumptive use, creates no 
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The public, too, could benefit from B’s unauthorized but 
productive use of A’s work. Statically, the public can consume the 
resulting work itself. And this, in turn, may yield distal static benefits. 
B’s new work may contribute to a richer cultural environment overall 
through the positive externalities that typically accompany creative 
production. B’s work might spawn a cultural movement, inspire artists 
to do related work, or just generate interesting commentary and 
popular-cultural references. The fruits of such success may result in 
public dynamic benefits as well, stimulating social demand for works 
like B’s and contributing to their increased production.  
 
And counterintuitively, the dynamic (but not internalized) 
effects of B’s unauthorized use could include benefits to A, the work’s 
owner. Many acts of copying create downstream benefits owners may 
never have foreseen.64 For example, B’s productive infringement 
might take the form of creating a device that enables widespread 
infringement, but opens up wholly new secondary markets for A. The 
VCR enabled rampant copying, but also ended up being a cash cow 
for the film industry (whose lobbyists initially insisted that the VCR 
would sound the death knell of the film industry).65 Or B’s 
unauthorized use could bring new attention to and interest in A’s 
work, especially where B’s unauthorized use goes viral and brings a 
broader, newer audience that A’s work never enjoyed before. 
Photojournalist Mannie Garcia threatened to sue for the unauthorized 
use of Garcia’s Barack Obama photo in Shepard Fairey’s iconic 
“Hope” poster. But he might have done better to send Fairey a thank-
you note. Fairey’s use brought Garcia’s work new vistas of 
                                                
64 See generally Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, The Knockoff Economy 
(2012) (discussing the underappreciated but numerous benefits of copying to owners 
of copied works).  
65 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) President Jack Valenti 
famously testified to Congress that “the VCR is to the American film producer and 
the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.” Home 
Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, 
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8 
(1982). A few years later, it became clear that Valenti had it exactly wrong. The 
advent of the videotape medium actually turned out to diversify and expand the 
market for movies and has been an enormously lucrative development for the film 
industry. See Giovanna Fessenden, Peer-to-Peer Technology: Analysis of 
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commercial popularity, so much so that 200 prints of Garcia’s Obama 
photo recently sold for $1,200 apiece in a Chelsea art gallery.66 
 
Table 2 summarizes the benefits of B’s infringement where 
that infringement takes the form of a productive use:  
 
Table 2:  Benefits of B’s infringement: productive use 
 
 Private Public 
Static Costless use of A’s work as an 
input to create new work; 
riches, fame, and prestige due 
to use of A’s work 
Consumption of new work resulting 
from B’s unauthorized use; richer 
cultural environment resulting from 
consumption and existence of B’s new 
work; inspiration to third parties 
affected by B’s work; “joy of piracy” 
Dynamic Increased incentives to create 
new works due to past success 
(?) 
Increased demand for A’s work due to 
new markets or complementary 
devices  
 
 Two points immanent in the foregoing discussion warrant 
further discussion. The first is the central role of productive versus 
consumptive use in the welfare calculus for infringement, and the 
asymmetry this creates with respect to infringement’s costs and 
benefits. The capacity of unauthorized use to generate social benefits 
varies greatly. Some unauthorized uses, like downloading a single 
track via Limewire for personal consumption, bring the user value but 
generate no other meaningful social value. Others, like appropriating 
an AP photograph in order to make a political poster, can render 
benefits for the user, the public, and even the owner of the infringed 
work. By contrast, the range of costs inflicted by an infringing act is 
relatively small. The owner of a sound recording downloaded illegally 
via Limewire, and the owner of an AP photograph each experience 
roughly proportional losses in the form of unpaid licensing fees,67 with 
commensurate dynamic and public cost implications. This asymmetry 
                                                
66 Noam Cohen, Viewing Journalism as a Work of Art, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/arts/design/24photo.html. 
67 It was not clear who owned the rights to the Obama photograph Fairey used. 
Garcia claimed he did, while AP argued that Garcia had contractually assigned to 
them all rights in the work. See Randy Kennedy, Artist Sues The A.P. Over Obama 
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means that unauthorized, purely consumptive uses almost certainly do 
not result in efficient infringement, while productive uses well might. 
 
 Whether a particular unauthorized productive use of a work of 
authorship will generate net social welfare, though, is fraught with 
uncertainty. While some productive infringement will generate 
significant welfare gains, not all such uses will do so. It is impossible 
to know, ex ante, whether a particular unauthorized use, even if 
formally productive, will be the next “Hope” poster, or will wither on 
the vine and find any social welfare gains it creates swamped by the 
social costs of the infringement. This uncertainty is particularly 
problematic in light of the asymmetry between infringement’s 
relatively constant costs and its relatively variant benefits. Since an 
owner loses the same amount regardless of the character of the 
unauthorized use, she will have an equal incentive to immediately 
quash all infringements alike. When the use at issue is purely 
consumptive, this is a perfectly good outcome. But when the use is 
productive, reflexively shutting it down could be costly for the user, 
the public, and even the owner herself. 
 
 Finally, it bears noting that the productive/consumptive use 
distinction can take us only so far. The foregoing discussion treats the 
distinction as a binary, but the story is more complicated. Some purely 
consumptive uses will generate more social value than others, even to 
the extent that such value is completely internalized. It creates 
negligible social value when a user illegally downloads movies or 
music tracks that they end up consuming and then forgetting about. 
But some consumptive uses promise greater social utility. Consider, 
for example, a student who acquires a digital version of an out-of-print 
book to read as helpful background for class discussions.68 Moreover, 
uses that do not result in a new and creative derivative work may still 
fairly be regarded as “productive” to the extent that they generate 
social value. Consider, for example, the Google Books Project, which 
makes verbatim copies of literary works for the purpose of making 
them available to the public.  
 
 But while these examples expose the blurriness of the 
consumptive/productive use distinction, they do not undermine its 
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usefulness. Some unauthorized uses are purely consumptive and do 
little more than deprive owners of due royalties. Such uses are 
extremely unlikely to amount to efficient infringement. Other uses are 
highly productive, and are much more likely to amount to efficient 
infringement. And once correctly understood as a continuum rather 
than a binary, the consumptive/productive use dichotomy serves as a 
useful heuristic for predicting the magnitude of social value a given 
use is likely to generate. As uses migrate from the consumptive to the 
productive end of the spectrum, they become more likely to create 
spillover value to the public rather than just internalized value to the 
user. 
 
  C. Where Private Ordering Isn’t: A Typology 
 
 Subpart II.B.2 mapped the costs and benefits of unauthorized 
use of works of authorship, but a crucial question remains: If the 
benefits of infringement would accrue regardless of whether the use 
was authorized or unauthorized, then how could infringement ever be 
a better option than authorized use? This Subpart outlines two such 
circumstances. One category is market-endogenous—a product of 
some flaw in markets for copyright license or assignment. That is, 
infringement may be welfare-enhancing where a productive use cannot 
be acquired through normal market channels because private ordering 
has broken down. The other category is market-exogenous—a product 
of some feature external to markets for copyright license or 
assignment. This Subpart uses the distinction between market-
endogenous and –exogenous uses as an organizational scheme to 
construct a taxonomy of conditions under which efficient copyright 
infringement may occur. 
 
Three qualifications about the ensuing taxonomy are in order. 
First, the taxonomy seeks to be thorough but not necessarily 
exhaustive. While it likely captures most instances where copyright 
infringement may be efficient, there may well be other circumstances 
that are not mentioned here. Second, these categories are by no means 
mutually exclusive. In some instances they may even be mutually 
reinforcing, as where the effect of a copyright owner’s overvaluation 
of their work is to suppress a use that is central to democratic 
discourse. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the categories 
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efficient. The suggestion is not that all uses that are precluded by high 
transaction costs, owners’ overvaluation, or external concerns about 
the costs of licensing markets are welfare enhancing. This Subpart 
uses extended examples to illustrate the possibility—and in each case, 
also the plausibility—of efficient unauthorized use. One might, of 
course, tell a counter-story in each instance in which a different 
unauthorized use may be welfare-diminishing even in the presence of 
a flaw that is endogenous or exogenous to licensing markets. But this 
does not diminish the point of the ensuing discussion, which is only 
that a nontrivial number of such uses are efficient, and that this matters 
to copyright law.  
 
 A. Market failure: transaction costs 
 
 Markets for licensed uses of popular works of authorship often 
work pretty well. If the Staples Center wants to perform jock rock 
during Lakers and Kings games (as they invariably do), they simply 
need to contact ASCAP and BMI for public performance licenses for 
each of the respective repertories. An individual who wants to acquire 
an .mp3 version of a popular music track for personal use can simply 
pay iTunes around 99 cents to download it to their hard drive. In other 
instances, though, lack of smoothly functioning markets render private 
ordering less available or unavailable to would-be users. Consider two 
iterations of high transaction costs. First, it may be unclear who owns 
rights to the work the user seeks to license, or how to go about 
acquiring those rights, especially for users who are not sophisticated 
repeat participants in licensing transactions.69 Related, even where 
owners are readily identifiable, the costs of negotiation and bargaining 
may be prohibitive, especially where there are numerous different 
licenses to negotiate in order to create a single work.  
 
What links these quite different stories is that they are both 
about licensing that has been frustrated by transaction costs.70 As 
Wendy Gordon explained in her foundational account, when the costs 
                                                
69 This concern has become known as the “orphan works” problem. See NEIL 
NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 200-02 (2008) (discussing orphan works). 
70 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); cf. 
also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094-95 & n.12 (1972) (analyzing 
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associated with acquiring a use license become greater than the value 
the user expects to internalize for the work, the user is likely to forego 
the use altogether.71 In the copyright context, the threat that transaction 
costs will undermine a welfare-enhancing use looms particularly large 
for two reasons. First, many unauthorized uses are socially valuable, 
but not greatly so, so that the risk that the use’s value will be 
overwhelmed by even moderate transaction costs is high. And second, 
many derivative works draw protected aspects from many different 
copyrighted works, so that they require a series of separate licensing 
transactions so numerous that, for a different reason, the cost of 
license acquisition likely overwhelm any private value the user would 
extract from the use. 
 
 A pair of examples illustrates the point. First, a provider of 
low-cost legal services posts on his professional website, verbatim and 
without permission, an article written and copyrighted by someone 
else. The article provides information about various novel legal 
strategies that have been used to resist foreclosure, but lists no contact 
information for the author and does not bear a copyright notice. As a 
result of the posting, about fifteen people read the article who would 
not have otherwise, and some are distressed homeowners who contact 
the legal services provider for help with their underwater mortgages. 
Second, a DJ makes a mashup song that consists entirely of samples—
twenty-five in total.72 The DJ does not seek licenses for any of the 
samples. The DJ makes .mp3 versions of the resulting track online on 
an optional donation basis.73 The track earns esteem among 
                                                
71 Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) 
(“When the transaction costs outweigh the net benefits that the parties would 
otherwise anticipate from a transfer, then the presence of the transaction costs may 
block an otherwise desirable shift in resource use.”). 
72 This number of samples is high, but not unusually so. Most hip hop tracks 
contain only ten or so samples, though they are often frequently repeated throughout 
the track. Some artists, however, construct tracks entirely from samples that may be 
much greater in number. The DJ Girl Talk, for example, used 322 samples to 
comprise his album “Feed the Animals” and 373 samples to comprise his album “All 
Day.” 
73 Musicians of various levels of popularity have made their albums available on 
a donation basis. Some popular groups, like Radiohead and Nine Inch Nails, have 
earned millions in voluntary donations, though less well-known indie artists have not 
had similar pecuniary success. See “NiN’s Donation Model Doesn’t Work for Most 
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underground music aficionados, and it earns the DJ about enough 
money to cover his costs of production.  
 
 In theory, each of these users could have acquired a license for 
the uses of the respective works of authorship in each example. In 
practice, though, both of the examples illustrate how license 
acquisition can generate prohibitive transaction costs. The provider’s 
story is one about the iteration of transaction costs commonly called 
search, or information, costs. The article he posted on the website bore 
no information about the ownership status of the work, requiring a 
costly search even to find out who holds the copyright in the work, let 
alone engage in bargaining for use rights to it. Especially because the 
provider’s use of the article was of relatively low value, rather than 
central or essential to his project, the onerous search costs associated 
with ascertaining a traditional use license would likely have been more 
trouble than the license would have been worth. The DJ presents a 
slightly different transaction cost story, one that is more about 
bargaining costs occasioned by a numerosity of owners rather than 
identification of rights owners themselves. Even if the ownership 
status of each of the sampled works is relatively clear, the time and 
trouble required to negotiate twenty-five separate use licenses would 
be massive. If the remix were thought to be a potential blockbuster and 
were bankrolled by a major record label, rights acquisition might be 
worth the trouble, but the DJ’s relatively low profit expectations for 
the track mean that the costs of license acquisition would probably 
overwhelm any value he might hope to extract from the resulting song. 
 
These hypothetical examples have many real world analogues. 
It may seem surprising that copyright owners would spend time and 
money litigating small-scale infringements. And usually, low-value 
infringing personal uses, such as photocopying, backing up your hard 
drive, or posting an unauthorized image on a blog, don’t result in 
litigation. But there are conspicuous exceptions that should make any 
user of copyrighted works concerned. Owners of literary work 
copyrights have sued users for making copyrights, and courts have 
agreed that even private photocopying amounts to infringement.74 The 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) brought suit 
against a man who copied his CD collection to his personal computer 
                                                
74 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995); see 
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for storage (but not filesharing) purposes.75 Even private 
rebroadcasting using devices like Slingbox may amount to 
infringement,76 and content owners have aggressively pursued cable 
companies for making unauthorized copies in the course of providing 
DVR services for their customers.77 And the ease with which users can 
publicly use copyrighted content on blogs or social media platforms 
like Facebook or Pinterest enable countless formal violations of 
copyright for re-posting unauthorized images and text.78 Some 
companies have even developed an infringement-based business 
model premised on identifying low-level (and often inadvertent) 
infringements and then pressuring unwitting users for settlement fees 
backed by credible threats of suit. Righthaven, for example, is a 
recently formed company that has sought to make a business out of 
acquiring the litigation rights in news articles and photos and then 
suing bloggers for their unauthorized use.79 Righthaven’s attempts to 
enforce assignments of rights to sue have thus far been stymied by 
courts,80 but litigation remains ongoing and Righthaven is aggressively 
seeking to enforce these assignments.81 But others, like Getty and 
MasterFile, have had consistent success threatening with litigation, 
                                                
75 Marc Fisher, “Download Uproar: Record Industry Goes After Personal Use,” 
Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2007 (describing pending litigation against Jeffrey 
Howell). 
76 See Litman, supra note 10 at 1900-01. 
77 E.g., Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2008) (avoiding a finding of infringement for a remote storage DVR only on the 
theory that temporary buffering did not last long enough to constitute a fixation) 
78 “Will Pinterest fall into Napster’s legal trap?”, TheWeek.com, March 16, 
2012, available at http://theweek.com/article/index/225677/will-pinterest-fall-into-
napsters-legal-trap. 
79 Steve Green, Righthaven extends copyright lawsuit campaign to individual 
Web posters, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 5, 2012, available at 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/jan/12/righthaven-extends-copyright-
lawsuit-campaign-indi/. Righthaven has recently developed a different strategy, 
acquiring from copyright owners not just a bare right to sue, but an assignment of the 
copyright, with a subsequent nonexclusive license back to the initial owner for all of 
the use rights in the work. The enforceability of such arrangements awaits final 
judicial determination. 
80 Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. 2011) (dismissing 
Righthaven’s infringement suit against user on jurisdictional and fair use grounds). 
81 Righthaven v. Hoehn was argued before the Ninth Circuit on February 5, 2013 
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and actually suing, users who make even trivial or inadvertent online 
uses of their works.82  
 
Relatedly, low-budget works that involve high numbers of 
samples invariably face substantial clearance costs, even where the 
expected value of the user’s resulting work is high.83 Some artists, like 
the DJ Girl Talk, have avoided infringement suits. Others have not 
been so fortunate. The Beastie Boys were sued for infringement—on 
the eve of Adam “MCA” Yauch’s death—that allegedly occurred on 
remixed tracks first released during the 1980s.84 The challenge for 
remix culture is made even greater by the hard line taken by federal 
courts, whose position is that even a seconds-long sample of a sound 
recording is infringing.85 Documentary filmmakers, whose works 
typically feature a pastiche of different visual clips that are likely 
copyright protected, find themselves in a similar clearance conundrum. 
To take just one example, Z Channel: A Magnificent Obsession 
documents a cable channel catering to Los Angeles’ cinephile culture, 
and required clearance of 53 film clips.86 Moreover, those clips each 
had to be separately re-cleared when the film was released in different 
media (theater, then cable, then DVD) and in different geographical 
                                                
82 E.g., Masterfile Corp. v. Gale, 2011 WL 4702862 (D. Utah. 2011) (granting 
summary judgment to MasterFile against a company that purchased and displayed 
online a presentation featuring unauthorized images). MasterFile and Getty’s relative 
success compared to Righthaven lies in their very different relationship with the 
owners of the works they acquire. Getty and MasterFile acquire rights to the works 
they administer, and engage in licensing of those works. Filing suit for unauthorized 
use is merely part of Getty and MasterFile’s purpose. By contrast, Righthaven exists 
purely for the purpose of suing, and scaring into settlement, as many unauthorized 
users as possible. See David Kravets, Defunct Copyright Troll Seeks Resurrection, 
Wired.com, July 3, 2012, available at 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/righthaven-second-life/. 
83 By contrast, higher budget works that entail fewer samples simply access the 
emergent market for sample licenses, which avoids any transaction costs problems.  
84 Marc Hogan, Beastie Boys Hit With Sampling Lawsuit on Eve of MCA’s 
Death, May 8, 2012, Spin.com, available at http://www.spin.com/articles/beastie-
boys-hit-sampling-lawsuit-eve-mcas-death 
85 The Sixth Circuit’s famously terse approach to the issue epitomizes this 
approach. “Get a license,” it stated in holding that a four-second clip infringed the 
plaintiff’s sound recording, “or do not sample.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films, Inc., 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
86 See Paul Cullum, Freedom of Information: Copyright and its Discontents, 






 Efficient Copyright Infringement 31 
regions. The film was released despite the exhausting transaction costs 
associated with it, but took a toll on the likelihood of similar films 
being created in the future. Producer Evan Shapiro vowed never to 
make a clip-intensive documentary again.87 
 
 Use licensing precluded by prohibitive costs represents the first 
iteration of market-endogenous conditions under which copyright 
infringement may be efficient. Private ordering may be frustrated 
either where the search costs of finding the copyright owner, or the 
iterated costs of separate rights-clearance negotiations, are 
prohibitively high. Where either of these conditions obtains, copyright 
infringement will be efficient where it is welfare-enhancing. The net 
social impact of any given use will always be to an extent 
indeterminate, but as the foregoing examples illustrate, there are 
numerous productive (as opposed to merely consumptive) uses that 
might be precluded by transaction costs concerns. This represents a 
serious concern given copyright’s goals of encouraging optimal  
creative production, and it is a problem I return to in Part III. 
 
 B. Market absence: public/private asymmetries and  
  cognitive biases 
 
 This Subpart discusses a second market-endogenous 
circumstance under which copyright infringement will be efficient.88 
Efficient infringement occurs also when a licensing transaction for a 
                                                
87 Elaine Dutka, No Free Samples for Documentaries: Seeking Film Clips With 
the Fair-Use Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/movies/28dutk.html. Other documentarians 
have observed that the costs—including transaction costs—of licensing clips have 
made producing certain kinds of films “almost impossible.” Kimberly Brown, 
Copyright vs. Creativity, REALSCREEN, June 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.realscreen.com/articles/magazine/20050601/copyright.html?word=Copy
right&word=vs.&word=Creativity. See also generally PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & 
PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS 
CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 11 (2001), available at 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf 
(cataloguing difficulties of rights clearance for documentarians making works with 
numerous clips). 
88 See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: 
Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the Story, 50 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 
149, 182-87 (2003) (explaining that market failure in copyright can be caused by 
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welfare-enhancing use fails to take place because the owner refuses to 
deal even when faced with a reasonable offer. There are two scenarios 
under which such refusals to deal may occur. First, owners may 
decline to license a use because the owners want to suppress the 
content of the copyrighted work itself. And second, owners may reject 
a reasonable licensing opportunity because they are subject to 
systematic cognitive biases that cause them to overvalue access to the 
work and decline even reasonable offers for socially beneficial uses. 
 
 Again, a pair of extended examples illustrates how each 
scenario may unfold. First, suppose that an ex-member of a relatively 
new religious organization has learned that the religion is actually a 
dangerously fraudulent cult. The ex-member posts reproductions of 
some of the church’s materials on his personal website to reveal the 
church’s inner workings to the public. The ex-member offers to pay a 
reasonable fee to post the works, but the religion refuses. Instead, the 
religion sues to enjoin the publication of their works, even though the 
works are economically valueless, in order to maintain total secrecy. 
Next, consider a major motion picture studio that owns the copyright 
to a recent blockbuster film. When a local artist wants to create and 
sell posters featuring fanciful “emo” versions of the main characters in 
the film,89 though, the studio orders the artist to cease and desist, 
without offering him the opportunity to bargain for a license. The artist 
also offers to pay a reasonable fee for a use license, but the studio 
refuses. The studio cites concerns about wanting to maintain total 
control over its brand as well as the relatively low value that such a 
licensing deal would bring in, especially compared to the lucrative 
deals with foreign distributors and major toy companies into which it 
typically enters into. 
 
 In each of these examples, the willingness of the user to 
acquire a license to use the respective copyrighted works is moot, 
because the owner simply refused to deal. But why, one might 
reasonably ask, is this bad? Isn’t this simply a necessary incident of a 
property owner’s right to exclude as well as an instance of 
presumptively beneficial private ordering?90 As a matter of law the 
                                                
89 This hypothetical example may seem strange, but it is based on an actual case. 
See infra at pp. 34-35. 
90 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of 
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copyright owner in each of these cases is, of course, entitled to decline 
to license (or, as the case may be, sue the user for infringement). But 
as we have seen, copyright does not seek only to facilitate private 
ordering, but to do so in a way that maximizes cultural production. 
And there are reasons in each of these cases to suspect that the 
licensing denials, while formally permissible, may undermine rather 
than further the constitutional aspirations of the copyright system. 
 
The first concern derives from the incommensurability of the 
value sought to be preserved by the owner in each case.91 Certain 
amenities transcend monetary valuation. This is a familiar point in 
daily discourse, as where people say that “you can’t put a price on” 
certain values like certain beloved objects like a family heirloom.92 
Here, what the religion seeks to achieve by enjoining its ex-member’s 
unauthorized use is secrecy—continued suppression of its (apparently 
fraudulent) inner workings from the public eye. The value of secrecy 
is abstract and classically incommensurable because it is not reducible 
to some monetary amount, and thus cannot be compared along the 
same metric as a traditional use license that seeks only to measure the 
economic value of the use to a licensee.93 It is also unmoored from 
standard market measures, like the reasonable value that a user might 
attach to it.94 The religion did not produce the good with a profit 
motive in mind, unlike standard literary works that are meant to be 
published, sold, and read. Just the contrary: Its texts were meant to 
remain private and unseen save for the eyes of insiders. And while this 
incommensurability explanation for why market processes break down 
                                                                                                               
up background rules that are subject to change by, and indeed meant to facilitate, 
private ordering). 
91 See Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot 
be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments 
about how these goods are best characterized.”). 
92 This idea emerges in substantive due process law as well, where certain state 
practices are regarded as so offensive to a notion of decency that they are banned 
regardless of whatever value they might serve. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
172-73 (1952) (holding that police may not force a witness to undergo an operation 
to remove a bullet even when it represented crucial evidence in a criminal case). 
93 See Sunstein, supra note 91 at 799-801 (characterizing as incommensurable 
the difficulty of comparing two goods or values that must be measured along 
different metrics). 
94 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 86 at 186-88 (discussing the 
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is most apt in the example of the dubious religion, it applies to the film 
studio as well. The studio’s refusal to deal with the emo artist was 
driven at least in part by a suppressive motive, though its goal was not 
to conceal a fraud, but to limit use of its work due to concerns about 
brand dilution.95 
 
 Skepticism about whether these refusals to deal represent 
healthy market function is further supported by a separate but related 
reason: Systematic bias on the part of each owner. While copyright’s 
standard account of creative production is premised on the vision of 
rational welfare-maximizing actors, research increasingly shows that 
humans are in fact boundedly rational.96 Numerous studies have 
shown that owners tend to overvalue goods they possess,97 including 
intangible goods like copyrights in works of authorship.98 Such 
overvaluation can cause owners, like the religion and film studio in 
these examples, to guard their works too jealously, resulting in an 
outsized fear on exposure of their secrets to the public or possible 
dilution of their brand. A variety of other cognitive biases may cause 
owners—especially corporate owners of highly valuable works—to 
fail to fully realize the value of their works. Owners may be averse to 
risks poses by edgier new uses, precluded by bureaucratic sclerosis 
from authorizing such uses, or simply indifferent to or too 
unimaginative to appreciate the potential of such uses.99 Deferring to 
                                                
95 This goal is obviously not as problematic as the religion’s information-
suppressive motivation, but it still raises concerns since copyright is not intended to 
avert brand dilution or consumer confusion. Copyright’s telos is to reward creative 
production in the interest of enriching society. Preserving brand integrity is the 
domain of trademark, and can (and should) be enforced using trademark law.  
96 The cornerstone account of behavioralism and the law is Christine Jolls, et al., 
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
97 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 193, 194-97 (1991) (describing the 
endowment effect); Christopher Buccafusco & Chris Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual 
Property: An Experiment, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2010) (“[A] mountain of survey and 
experimental data have shown that people attach substantially higher value to goods 
they own as compared to goods they are considering purchasing.”). 
98 Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 97 at 25 (summarizing results of a study 
showing that authors of works tend to value their works more highly than those who 
are seeking to buy them). 
99 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 88 at 182 (observing that 
licensors may pass up good deals due to causes including “personal risk aversion, 
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refusals to deal may thus represent not sound market function, but 
instead the reification of systematic and counterproductive 
overvaluation. And even if these refusals to deal are rational with 
respect to the owner (say, because they value suppression more than 
any available license fee), they could still exact net social costs to the 
extent that the public loses access to crucial information or edgy 
lower-value works.  
 
Of course, any denial of licensing could possibly be the result 
of the owner’s overvaluation of access to the work rather than an 
objective decision that the license fee offered was too low. Hence 
here, I discuss in detail one circumstance—illustrated by the second 
example above—where bias is especially likely to frustrate productive 
uses of works of authorship. Where there is a large, well-capitalized 
owner (like the film studio from our example) and a range of 
differently wealthy licensees (from major toy companies to the startup 
emo artist), the likelihood is especially strong that small-scale users 
will be priced out of the market because the owner will set license 
prices by the much greater amounts affordable to wealthier 
licensees.100 This effect is exacerbated by a related cognitive bias 
whereby regarding a good primarily as a market commodity tends to 
crowd out other motives for engaging in exchange with respect to that 
good, such as altruism.101 Now that content owners have realized that 
licensing can be like “sitting on a goldmine” for them (either as a 
result of exorbitant license fees or big infringement settlements and 
judgments),102 they are less likely to recognize the public-regarding 
                                                
100 In a classic illustration of the point, filmmaker Jon Else sought to clear the 
rights to a 4.5-second clip of The Simpsons that was visible in the background of a 
scene in his documentary. Fox demanded a $10,000 fee for the license—ostensibly 
an “educational rate”, but in absolute terms more similar to what other major content 
industries typically pay (and far beyond the means of a documentarian). See LESSIG, 
FREE CULTURE, supra note 29 at 95-97 (discussing the Else case); see also 
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 87 at (describing a dynamic by which content 
industries have ceased to engage in individualized bargaining with smaller licensees 
for film rights, instead demanding prices approaching those affordable only to other 
major creative owners and producers). 
101 See ARIELY, supra note 61 at 75-82 (comparing market norms and social 
norms). 
102 See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, Will 
Fair Use Survive? Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control 6 (2005), 
available at http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf 
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value of permitting playful, basically harmless variations, “emo” or 
otherwise, to emerge, and instead regard them as merely an 
unauthorized financial threat to be quashed. 
 
 And as was the case in the preceding subpart, the hypothetical 
examples used to illustrate this point are all drawn from real cases. 
The initial example involving a religion seeking to use copyright to 
suppress internal materials was modeled on several infringement 
lawsuits brought by the Church of Scientology, which has used 
copyright as an offensive tool to stop ex-members from posting its 
writings online in the context of critical discussions.103 Literary work 
owners and their heirs have also used copyright to stop the release of 
historically relevant writings104 and, in some cases, even to suppress 
the use of quotations in academic work.105 Content industries have 
denied documentarians licenses to use their clips due to fear of 
political backlash, as where CBS refused to license a clip of George 
W. Bush to the makers of the film Uncovered: The Whole Truth about 
the Iraq War—despite an offer of full compensation—because the 
studio did not want to be perceived as criticizing the President.106 And 
some copyrights are used suppressively out of what appears to be plain 
old spite. The owner of the copyright in the Baltimore Ravens’ 
original logo, for example, apparently feels robbed of due recognition 
by the team. As a result, he continues to aggressively pursue copyright 
infringement suits against incidental uses of the logo in Ravens 
                                                
103 E.g., Religious Technology Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Va. 1995); 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Colo. 1995); 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 
1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The First Circuit also recently upheld a district court finding 
of liability against an Orthodox archbishop for posting on his website translations of 
religious works that he had helped create but did not own. Society of the Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery v. Gregory, __ F.3d __  (No. 11-1262) (1st Cir. Aug. 2, 
2012). 
104 Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 
105 See Gordon Bowker, “An End to Bad Heir Days,” The Independent, Jan. 6, 
2012, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/books/features/an-end-to-bad-heir-days-the-posthumous-power-of-
the-literary-estate-6285277.html (describing the efforts of James Joyce’s literary heir 
to use copyright as a means of suppressing any public use or textual quotation of 
Joyce’s works, contributing to “the long absence of a comprehensive [biography] of 
the author”).  
106 Lawrence Lessig, Copyrighting the President, WIRED MAG., Aug. 2004, 





 Efficient Copyright Infringement 37 
historical films and photos107—though since his work was not 
registered, Bouchat’s total money damages against the Ravens have to 
date totaled a mere $721.65.108 
 
The second example in this subpart is also modeled on a real-
world example: JSalvador’s “Super Emo Friends.”109 JSalvador’s 
work featured “emo” variations of various superheroes, and was sold 
on Etsy.com for very low prices. After achieving some underground 
notoriety for his work, the artist heard from Marvel, but not with an 
offer to arrange a mutually beneficial licensing deal, but rather a 
cease-and-desist notice demanding removal of all work using Marvel’s 
character copyrights. JSalvador complied with the notice, and then 
sought to negotiate reasonably (but modestly) priced licenses for his 
uses from the relevant copyright owners, but received the consistent 
response that there was no interest in granting use permission under 
any circumstances.110  
 
Overvaluation bias can lead to holdup problems even when the 
owner’s work is merely an incidental part of the use. The song “Happy 
Birthday” remains copyrighted until at least 2030, and its owners have 
taken advantage of the work’s ubiquity to demand “brutal” licensing 
fees whenever it is sung in a film scene.111 For lower budget films, 
these licensing fees can prove prohibitive, causing filmmakers to 
                                                
107 Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that use of original Baltimore Ravens logo in historical films about the team 
was not a fair use); see also Lorraine Mirabella, “Logo artist files copyright lawsuits 
against Ravens, NFL,” available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-07-
02/business/bs-bz-ravens-logo-lawsuit-20120702_1_ravens-and-nfl-frederick-e-
bouchat-new-logo (reporting on a recently filed suit by the original Ravens logo 
owner for displays of the logo in photos at the team’s stadium). 
108 Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 2012 WL 6738321 (D. Md. Dec. 
27, 2012) (slip op.). 
109 http://superemofriends.com/ 
110 See emails from JSalvador, on file with author. 
111 If this example makes you wonder whether you’re committing copyright 
infringement whenever you sing “Happy Birthday” to a friend in a restaurant, it 
should—and you probably are. See 17 U.S.C. sec. 106(4) (securing an exclusive 
right of public performance in owners of copyrighted works, including musical 
works); id. sec. 101 (defining “public” to include any place open to the public). 
Hence most films with birthday-singing scenes feature the public domain work “For 
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consider scrapping even crucial scenes because they cannot afford to 
license “Happy Birthday.”112 Even an incidental, but copyrighted, 
occurrence like a ring tone going off113 or a TV clip flickering in the 
background of a room114 can lead to licensing fees in the five 
figures—affordable to a major film producer but not to a less wealthy 
one. 
 
Where copyright owners’ refusals to deal are subject to 
systematic overvaluation biases, and/or where they are inspired by 
information- or expression-suppressive motivations, infringements that 
create net social welfare may well be efficient. As with the previous 
discussion, though, the question whether a given use will enhance 
social welfare is so difficult as to be insoluble. But the preceding 
examples and cases point in the direction of some general principles 
that can help illuminate when infringement is most likely to be 
efficient. First, as the grids from Part II.B illustrated, a public/private 
asymmetry accompanies all copyright enforcement and consumption. 
Enforcement is delegated to owners, who internalize all the benefits of 
a license or an infringement judgment. But the costs of excessive or 
unreasonable enforcement—the lost benefits of the foregone use—will 
be borne largely by the public. Owners thus have no incentive to 
govern their works in a way that attends to the public benefits 
copyright use can generate.115 So when a use is productive, and 
owners’ enforcement motivations seem infected by suppressive 
intention or systematic bias, the likelihood that infringement will 
enhance aggregate social welfare is particularly high.  
 
 C. Market costs: anti-commodification and the   
  copyright/free speech tension 
 
                                                
112 AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 87 at 11 (describing the problems posed 
by exorbitant licensing fees to feature “Happy Birthday” in a pivotal scene in the 
documentary “Hoop Dreams”). 
113 Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2005, at A13. 
114 LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 29 at 95-97 (discussing the Jon Else 
case). 
115 This is copyright’s iteration of the public choice problem, where 
concentrated interest groups tend to win out in political processes over distributed 
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 The previous two Subparts discussed two ways that private 
ordering might fail to enable licensing of socially productive uses of 
copyrighted works, raising the possibility of efficient copyright 
infringement. While different, each of the reasons that private ordering 
failed discussed above were market-endogenous. They were related to 
concerns flowing from either transaction costs or concerns about an 
owner’s socially costly refusal to deal. This Subpart considers market-
exogenous concerns about private ordering instead. These are reasons 
to think that subjecting certain kinds of uses of copyrighted works to 
market forces may itself exact costs so high that unauthorized use may 
be preferable. Two variations are offered. In one scenario, the very 
fact of licensing tends to undermine the impact of the work. In the 
other, the use is so closely tied to a constitutional or statutory right that 
requiring licensing for the use complicates—if not outright violates—
the state’s guarantee of that right. 
 
 Again, consider two illustrative examples. First, imagine that 
an appropriation artist116 creates a visual collage that combines several 
copyrighted magazine photographs. The photographs are all available 
for reasonable licensing fees, but the artist uses them without with 
permission, since the unauthorized character of the taking is key to his 
status as a rebellious outsider figure. The collage satirizes a different, 
rival artist, without sending any particular message about the 
photographs that comprise the collage. Second, suppose that a political 
lobbying group supports a particular candidate, and reprints verbatim 
substantial parts of his recently published biography on their website 
in order to illustrate aspects of his life history and personal philosophy 
they support. The lobby chose to use the verbatim excerpts because 
they felt that the biography itself best captured the candidate’s appeal, 
and was more persuasive since it used his own words. The lobby could 
have contacted the biography’s publisher for a license to reprint the 
sections, but simply chose not to. 
  
                                                
116 Contemporary appropriation artists make works that are composed of 
preexisting art, assembling them to create new—albeit derivative—works. Jeff 
Koons is likely the most popularly recognizable appropriation artist, while Thierry 
Guetta earned recent fame thanks to his being featured in the film Exit Through the 
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 In contrast to the examples discussed in the preceding subparts, 
these examples assume that licensing markets are functioning perfectly 
well. The owners would be willing to sell a license, and the users 
could afford one. In each case, then, an argument that licensing is 
unavailable must be exogenous—that is, outside or a product of—
market function itself. In the artist’s case, the concern is that 
subjecting the use to a licensing scheme invariably weakens the 
effectiveness of the use. This is because seeking permission would 
have undermined an important aspect of the collage’s message. The 
artist’s method is unauthorized appropriation, and this depends on his 
art being transgressive and illicit.117 To seek permission and defer to 
legal norms would risk neutering the countercultural power of the 
artist’s work.118 The concern is a variation on anticommodification: 
The argument of Margaret Radin and others that rendering some 
behavior or goods subject to market forces exacts social costs that 
overwhelm any benefits created by exchange in those goods.119 For 
example, resistance to markets in babies or organs derives from a 
sense that such markets would corrode our sense that human life is 
sacred, or that bodily integrity is sacrosanct.120 So too, here, requiring 
a street artist to participate in traditional licensing markets in order to 
acquire rights as a precondition to creation would exact harm on the 
resulting work itself, by converting outsider art into insider art. 
 
                                                
117 Much, though not all, appropriation features transgression as a major theme, 
and depends on unauthorized use to communicate this message. Shelley Walker 
observed that “Stealing may be a cooler, more street term for appropriation.” 
Barbara Pollack, Copy Rights, ARTNews, March 22, 2012, available at 
http://www.artnews.com/2012/03/22/copy-rights/. And Richard Prince boasted that 
“I didn’t exactly ‘fall’ [into photography] as much as steal.” Laura Gilbert, No 
longer appropriate?, The Art Newspaper, May 2012, available at 
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/No-longer-appropriate/26378.  
118 Nor is it the only instance where paying for something changes the 
experience entirely. This is the primary distinction between prostitution and 
consensual sex.  
119 Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1871-87 
(1987). 
120 Cf. id. at 1885 (“Universal market rhetoric transforms our world of concrete 
persons, whose uniqueness and individuality is expressed in specific personal 
attributes, into a world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less entities possessing a 
wealth of alienable, severable ‘objects.’ This rhetoric reduces the conception of a 
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 Requiring permission would raise different market-exogenous 
concerns in the lobby’s case. The lobby could have merely negotiated 
a license with the publisher to reprint part of the politician’s 
biography, so its conduct initially appears to be a straightforward act 
of infringement. But featuring the excerpts on their website, even if 
infringing, was also an act of core political expression—announcing 
and articulating their support for a candidate for public office. 
Requiring that such expression be subject to licensing raises serious 
questions about tension between copyright and First Amendment 
rights to engage in political speech. In many settings, law reflexively 
rejects the notion that a right remains meaningful when it is subject to 
a price. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for example, is not 
satisfied by the mere existence of costly lawyers that a criminal 
defendant could hire for a sufficient retainer fee. Instead, the Supreme 
Court has held that the right to counsel requires provision of counsel to 
all defendants, including for free to indigents.121  
 
The nexus between copyright and the First Amendment and 
copyright is obviously more complex, and certainly the rule cannot be 
that any time a U.S. citizen wants to engage in self-expression, 
copyright takes a back seat. But the possibility that of copyright may 
threaten speech interests is well established.122 One of copyright’s 
goals is to sustain a democratic civil society,123 and yet the Copyright 
Act enables state agents enforcing infringement judgments to use force 
for the purpose of suppressing its citizens’ expression—even going so 
                                                
121 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
122 A litany of cases in the past decade has entertained Speech Clause challenges 
to copyright laws or their enforcement. While courts have taken seriously the 
premise that copyright and the Speech Clause lie in tension with one another, most 
of these constitutional challenges have failed. E.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 
(2012) (rejecting a Speech Clause challenge to copyright restoration provisions of 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 
(invalidating a Speech Clause challenge to the Copyright Term Extension Act); 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a 
Speech Clause challenge to an injunction issued under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act). For a conspicuous exception, see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (invalidating, on a Speech Clause theory, an 
injunction against publication of a parody of Gone With the Wind). 
123 See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil 
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far as seizing and destroying copies of infringing works.124 Speech 
concerns are particularly salient in the copyright context because 
requiring paid permission to use a copyrighted work for the purpose of 
self-expression approximates the kind of speech-licensing requirement 
that garners particularly strong First Amendment skepticism.125 So 
where, as here, a substantial free speech interest is threatened by 
copyright enforcement, there is at least a plausible argument that the 
enforcement may raise significant rights-based concerns.126 
  
 These hypothetical examples find analogues in numerous 
actual controversies and litigated cases. As iconic examples like Andy 
Warhol and Barbara Kruger illustrate, much modern visual art takes as 
its theme rebellion and resistance, and as its method appropriation.127 
The concern that permitted use will undermine the message sent by the 
work itself applies to a significant proportion of contemporary art, 
especially as creative production increasingly involves and depends on 
(often unkind) references to previous work.128 The ensuing tension 
                                                
124 17 U.S.C. sec. 503(a) (authorizing judges to order seizure of infringing 
copies and the means by which they were produced). See Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 337, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (ordering that appropriation artist (and his 
gallery) found liable for copyright infringement “deliver up for impounding, 
destruction, or other disposition, as Plaintiff determines, all infringing copies of the 
photographs, including paintings and unsold copies of the Canal Zone book, … and 
all transparencies, plates, masters, tapes, film, negatives, disks, and other articles for 
making such infringing copies”). 
125 See Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 405, 410 
(“Nothing was more severely forbidden by the First Amendment's guarantee of 
speech and the press than licensing--the requirement that one get permission before 
speaking or using the press—and this proscription was fortunate.”). 
126 Cf. Neil Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (developing a doctrinal framework for subjecting copyright 
to Speech Clause scrutiny). 
127 As artist Mike Bidlo colorfully put it, “Appropriation art brings masterpieces 
to a whole new generation. New generations need new blood to live. Yes, they need 
fresh blood continually. If we have to do that by standing on the shoulders of giants 
and penetrating their necks like vampires, then that’s the spice of life.” See Pollack, 
note 117 supra (quoting Bidlo). 
128 See id. (“Appropriation art is a well-recognized modern and postmodern art 
form that has challenged the way people think about art, challenged the way people 
think about objects, images, sounds, culture.”) (quoting copyright attorney Josh 
Schiller). This tradition of critical copying ranges much more broadly than just 
modern appropriation art, having roots that go back at least as far as Marcel 
Duchamp. See Donald Kuspit, Spiritualism and Nihilism: The Second Decade, 
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between modern art and copyright ownership continues to produce 
litigation, and courts have tended to favor owners in these disputes. 
Contemporary artist Jeff Koons has been involved in five separate 
lawsuits, winning the most recent,129 but losing or settling the previous 
four.130 Shepard Fairey’s work takes disobedience and resistance as 
one of its major themes, and is hence unapologetically appropriative. 
The infringement lawsuit brought by the AP against Fairey for his 
unauthorized use of a news photo as the basis for the iconic “Hope” 
poster of Barack Obama led to undisclosed settlement.131 And most 
recently, artist Richard Prince (and the gallery that featured his work, 
the Gagosian, which was named as co-defendant) lost an infringement 
lawsuit, and suffered a heavy adverse judgment, for the unauthorized 
use of Patrick Cariou’s photographs in Prince’s “Yes, Rasta” series.132 
And beyond the modern art context, one can readily imagine 
unauthorized, verbatim uses of copyrighted works whose efficacy 
would depend on their unauthorized character. If Julian Assange’s 
                                                                                                               
17-06.asp (cataloguing the contemporary relevance and historical importance of 
Duchamp’s appropriative art). 
129 Blanch v. Koons, 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Koons’ 
unauthorized use of a photographer’s work in a collage was fair use because it 
parodied the owner’s work). 
130 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir 1992) (holding that Koons’ 
unauthorized use of a photographer’s work in a sculpture was not fair use, but 
merely appropriation). See also Gilbert, supra note 117 (reporting that Koons’ has 
four losses or settlements versus his one win in copyright infringement suits). 
131 Randy Kennedy, Shepard Fairey and the AP Settle Legal Dispute, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/arts/design/13fairey.html. Fairey’s work is 
unapologetically appropriative, which has led some artists to criticize him as a 
plagiarist. Their objection is less about potential lost licensing revenue than a sense 
of disrespect occasioned by Fairey’s failure to attribute. See Dan Wasserman, How 
Phony Is Shepard Fairey? The Boston Globe, Feb 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/outofline/2009/02/how_phon
y_is_shepard_fairey.html (cataloguing complaints from artists used by Fairey and 
others about lack of appropriate attribution). 
132 Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Second Circuit 
heard an appeal of the district court’s judgment for Cariou earlier this year. The 
appellate decision has not yet been issued. In oral argument, though, the court 
compared the district court’s remedial order—which required Prince to destroy all 
existing copies of his works that made unauthorized uses of Cariou’s photographs—
to conduct reminiscent of the Taliban. Brian Boucher, “Injunction in Prince v. 
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Wikileaks disclosures had come with the permission and blessing of 
the U.S. Government, that would have raised very real skepticism that 
they truly represented a fully critical and accurate vision of the 
military’s internal communications. 
 
 The domain of uses that would be thematically undone by the 
very act of licensing is relatively narrow and well-defined. By 
contrast, the number of uses that are expressive enough that their 
suppression would raise constitutional concerns is sprawling. Others 
have assayed to describe this latter domain in much detail,133 and I 
pause here only to point out a few actual cases that illustrate the 
capacity of outright copying to enable constitutionally protected 
expression for speakers. Rebecca Tushnet has articulated three 
categories of copying as expression.134 Outright copying can enable 
self-expression (Hallmark Cards employ someone else’s expression to 
communicate one’s own feelings), more effectively persuade others 
(legal reasoning relies heavily on direct quotation from respected 
authorities), or reaffirm one’s belonging to a particular group (consider 
recitations of allegiance oaths or sacred prayers).135 Yet where self-
expression entails outright copying—and is therefore likely 
infringing—users tend to come out second best. In recent years, 
political candidates including John McCain and Charlie Crist have 
used popular musical works to express themes from their campaigns. 
Owners responded in each case by suing for infringement, resulting in 
settlements and apologies by the candidates.136 The internet and digital 
                                                
133 See, generally, e.g., Netanel, Locating the First Amendment, supra note 126. 
134 While the lobby would have been free to restate the candidate’s story in their 
own words, it is not unreasonable to think that this might have diluted their message. 
Often direct appropriation, particularly of the words of someone you believe in, is an 
invaluable way of expressing a given message. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This 
Essay, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 566-67 (2004) (“Copying can serve as self-expression, 
using the most apt words to explain and define beliefs and thoughts; it can assist 
persuasion, using the best words to reach a particular audience; and it can work as 
affirmation, a way of connecting to a larger group.”). 
135 Tushnet, supra note at 562-82. 
136 David Byrne of the Talking Heads sued Florida candidate Charlie Crist for 
his unauthorized use of “Road to Nowhere” in campaign stops, seeking $1m in 
damages. Crist settled the lawsuit and publicly apologized to Byrne. 
http://www.billboard.com/news/david-byrne-sues-florida-gov-charlie-crist-
1004093436.story. Jackson Browne sued John McCain for unauthorized use of his 
musical work “Running on Empty” in campaign stops, also resulting in a settlement 
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media have enabled expressive copying to an extent unfathomable 
when the 1976 Act was passed, with the result that much expression 
that takes place online likely counts as both protected speech as well 
as copyright infringement. The website Pinterest, for example, permits 
users to construct “pinboards” (personal pages) that re-post from sites 
around the internet images that the user likes, and that are then sorted 
into different categories for other users to view, comment on, and 
perhaps re-pin themselves.137 In the aggregate, a user’s pinboard tells a 
deeply personal story about their preferences and identity. But it’s also 
a locus of countless possible infringements, since Pinterest pinboards 
can contain hundreds or even thousands of verbatim, unauthorized 
public displays of copyrighted works.138 
 
 Copyright infringement may be efficient under conditions that 
are exogenous to licensing markets. Where the costs of subjecting a 
particular use threaten to overwhelm the gains produced by 
commercial exchange in the work, permitting infringement rather than 
allowing owners to block the use may enhance social welfare. This 
may occur in one of two cases. First, the mere act of seeking 
permission for a use may undermine the value of that use itself, 
threatening entire genres with extinction, as illustrated by the example 
and cases about transgressive contemporary art. And second, requiring 
users to obtain (and, typically, pay for) permission to engage in uses 
that are also core exercises of constitutional rights under the Speech 
Clause highlights the tension between copyright and free speech that 
                                                                                                               
This example illustrates that the expression entailed in unauthorized use can cut 
in both directions—a political candidate might claim a speech right to use a musical 
work without permission, but at the same time, the owner of that speech might 
counter that the unauthorized use in a political context of which they do not approve 
amounts to coerced speech. Of course, since that speech is not being coerced by the 
state, it may not rise to the level of constitutional concern. Cf. West Va. Bd. of Educ. 
v. Barnette, 319 624 (1943) (holding that the Speech Clause prevents public schools 
from being able to require students to say the Pledge of Allegiance or to salute the 
flag). 
137 http://pinterest.com/ 
138 Cf. Kirsten Kowalski, Why I Tearfully Deleted my Pinterest Inspiration 
Boards, Feb. 24, 2012, available at http://ddkportraits.com/2012/02/why-i-tearfully-
deleted-my-pinterest-inspiration-boards (blog posting from a lawyer who is also a 
photographer and Pinterest user explaining that she took down her Pinterest 
pinboards due to a concern about copyright infringement as well as out of respect for 
photographers’ moral rights); see also emails from Kirsten Kowalski, on file with 
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has increasingly concerned commentators and some courts for over a 
decade. This problem arises in contexts that are ever more numerous 
as culture and technology make self-expression through verbatim 
copying both increasingly compelling and readily available.  
 
*  *  * 
 
 So far, this Article has focused on what efficient copyright 
infringement is. Before moving on to the third and final Part of this 
Article, I pause briefly to observe what it is not. Identifying the 
relatively rare number of cases in which unauthorized use enhances 
social welfare should not detract from the fact that most infringement 
is consumptive, not productive use. Much purely consumptive use is 
almost certainly socially costly and there is no warrant for its 
toleration by courts or society.139 Most unauthorized p2p filesharing of 
copyrighted sound recordings, for example, represents a deadweight 
loss for society. Owners lose royalties to which they’re entitled, 
musicians are de-incentivized, and except in sparing cases, no 
rationale justifies users’ unauthorized acquisitions of the works.140 Nor 
is this argument in favor of efficient copyright infringement an 
unqualified defense of unauthorized appropriation and remix culture. 
“Information wants to be free” is a rallying cry for many, but neither 
makes good policy nor accurately reflects the content of law. 
Unauthorized use of copyrighted works of authorship can be justified 
on an efficiency theory not only where the use is welfare enhancing, 
but also where some reasonable justification exists for not going the 
standard route of licensing. Hence an unauthorized low-value sample 
of a sound recording might be permissible on a transaction-cost 
theory, but a sample for a mainstream, high-budget release by a major 
record label that has both plenty of money and knowledge about how 
industry works would not. 
 
III. THE LAW OF EFFICIENT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
                                                
139 But cf. KATYAL & PENALVER, supra note 12 (arguing that mass online 
disobedience in the form of widespread filesharing can send a powerful message 
about changing social norms about copyright, leading to productive dialogues and 
social change). 
140 See Sony BMG v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(rejecting a fair use argument in defense of p2p filesharing, albeit also expressing 





 Efficient Copyright Infringement 47 
 
 The previous two Parts described efficient copyright 
infringement as a matter of theory. But how does this general idea 
translate into law? This Part answers that question in two steps. First, 
it examines how the Copyright Act’s user-oriented limitations on 
exclusive rights do not match up with the account of efficient 
copyright infringement articulated above. And second, it explores a 
variety of ways in which damages for unauthorized use might be 
modified to better adjusted to account for efficient copyright 
infringement.  
 
 A. Efficient Infringement and the Copyright Act 
 
 The Copyright Act is not unequivocal in its condemnation of 
unauthorized use. It does assay in several places to create exceptions 
to the general principle that owners enjoy exclusive rights to use their 
works.141 The most familiar such exception is writ large: Section 107’s 
provision immunizing fair use from infringement liability.142 Many 
others are writ small, such as section 110’s finely targeted subject-
matter specific exemptions,143 or at least smaller, such as section 109’s 
first sale doctrine.144 With all these user-friendly carve-outs, one might 
wonder whether there’s not already a doctrine of efficient copyright 
infringement scattered throughout Title 17. As the ensuing subpart 
explains, while the Copyright Act takes account of the upside of 
copying in some ways, both doctrinal narrowness and practical hurdles 
to enforcement undermine the Act’s capacity to fully effect an 
efficient infringement regime. 
 
 Begin with fair use. This longstanding defense to copyright 
infringement permits those faced with infringement a full defense 
                                                
141 Indeed, sections 107-122 of the Copyright Act comprise various exceptions 
to owners’ exclusive rights.  
142 17 U.S.C. sec. 107 (outlining four mandatory factors courts must consider in 
order to determine whether an otherwise infringing work is permissible as a fair use: 
the purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount 
of the work used; and the effect of the use on current or future markets for the work). 
143 17 U.S.C. sec. 110(1) (immunizing from infringement liability public 
performances of copyrighted works of authorship in the course of “face to face 
teaching”). 
144 17 U.S.C. sec. 109(a), 109(c) (immunizing from infringement liability public 
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(and, effectively, a zero-cost compulsory license to use the owner’s 
work) if they can show that an on-balance consideration of four 
statutory factors favors their use. The fair use test embodied in section 
107 seeks to consider, among other things, aspects of the social value 
generated by an unauthorized use (including increasingly exclusive 
attention to whether a use is transformative)145 as well as the costs of 
the use on the work’s owner.146 The fair use provisions are meant to 
operate as a safe harbor for many of the unauthorized uses that 
enhance social welfare. Yet due to both the defense’s relatively limited 
substantive scope, as well as to pragmatic hurdles associated with its 
enforcement, section 107 falls short of the aspiration of effecting an 
efficient copyright infringement system.  
 
First, fair use itself has grown underinclusive. While it was 
first conceived as a broad common law defense that operated to assure 
that copyright enforcement did not undermine the public interest, its 
development has, in many respects, expanded owners’ rights at the 
expense of users’ prerogatives.147 Part of this problem is rooted in the 
natural-rights view of copyright on which fair use is premised. By 
positioning fair use as an exception to an otherwise broad owner’s 
suite of rights in the copyrighted work, the doctrine seems to suggest 
that all that is not fair use is infringement.148 This is inconsistent with 
the Framers’ original vision of copyright, pursuant to which an 
owner’s monopoly extended only as far as was necessary to encourage 
an optimal level of creative production.149  
 
                                                
145 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (holding that 
transformative uses are more likely to be fair); see also Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair 
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990) (elaborating the notion of 
transformative use). 
146 Factor four considers the harm inflicted by the unauthorized use on the 
current or future value or market for the work. 17 U.S.C. sec. 107(4) (requiring 
courts to consider the “effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work”). 
147 John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural Law Copyright, 38 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465 (2005) (arguing that the emergence and codification of fair 
use expanded owners’ rights at the expense of users’ rights). 
148 See Tehranian, supra note at 480-92 (arguing that fair use expanded owners’ 
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Relatedly, fair use’s reputation as notoriously open-ended150 
has caused judges to cast about for particular bright-line rules on 
which to determine their analysis. So, for example, the emergence of 
transformativeness as the dominant criterion of factor-one analysis151 
has caused judges to conclude that any use that any use that is not 
transformative is unfair, thereby excluding from the ambit of fair use 
even highly expressive (even if not transformative) unauthorized 
uses.152 Similarly, in Acuff-Rose, the Court established a rough rule of 
thumb to help organize fair use analysis: Parodic uses tend to be more 
likely to be transformative than satirical ones.153 But courts, in their 
desire to make sense of the balancing-test soup that is the fair use test, 
have transformed this rough rule of thumb into a the parody/satire 
distinction as the inflexible, binary driver of the factor one analysis, so 
that many courts evaluate fair use almost entirely in terms of whether a 
work is a parody (and hence fair) or a satire (and hence unfair).154  
 
                                                
150 Academics love to come up with the most poetic way to describe fair use’s 
indeterminacy. David Nimmer remarked that expecting certainty from the fair use 
factors is “naught but a fairy tale.” David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other 
Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 287 (2003). And Jessica 
Litman colorfully characterized much of copyright law, but especially fair use, as 
nothing but “billowing white goo.” Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 596 (2008). Others, though, have questioned whether fair 
use is as indeterminate as commentators typically think. See Pam Samuelson, 
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537 (2009) (arguing that most fair use 
cases fit into one of several categories, and that fair use thus is more coherent and 
predictable than most commentators believe). 
151 Neil Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 
(2011) (reporting results of an empirical study showing that “since 2005 the 
transformative use paradigm has come overwhelmingly to dominate fair use 
doctrine”). 
152 See Tushnet, supra note 134 at 582-86. 
153Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580-81. 
154 E.g., Burnett v. Fox, 491 F. Supp. 2d 962 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that 
Family Guy reference to Carol Burnett was fair use based almost exclusively on the 
basis of its status as parody, not satire). A court could not rely exclusively on the 
parody/satire distinction, since section 107 requires consideration of all four fair use 
factors. As the foregoing example illustrates, though, judicial decisions about fair 
use often focus primarily and dominantly on parody/satire by resolving each of the 
four factors in light of parody/satire analysis. E.g., Burnett, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 971-
72 (concluding that factor four weighs in favor of fair use because the use was a 





 Efficient Copyright Infringement 50 
 Second, the social perception of the fair use defense as 
vague155 combined with the Copyright Act’s stiff penalties for 
infringement156 creates a double bind for users. Even if a use is likely 
fair, the doctrine’s vagueness always leaves open the possibility that a 
court may rule otherwise. Users157 thus have to choose between 
engaging in the use, and tolerating some scary risk of massive liability, 
or foregoing the use to which they are likely entitled. Given that many 
productive uses generate relatively low (although not necessarily 
unimportant or trivial) social value, and that many creators of such 
lower-value uses are impecunious (or aren’t even creating out of a 
desire for pecuniary gain), even low-probability threats of massive 
liability are likely to deter them.158 The result of this dynamic is that 
fair use tends to grow ever smaller, and owners’ rights ever greater, 
both in practical terms and as a matter of law.159 
 
 The examples used throughout Part II illustrate fair use’s 
underinclusiveness as well as the risk aversion issues it raises. Fair use 
tends to prefer transformative uses, but the Part II examples (the legal 
services provider’s reprinting of a full article, the lobbying group’s 
reproduction of large sections of the politician’s bio) involve verbatim 
reproduction of all or at least part of the owners’ works. Fair use tends 
to favor uses that aren’t commercial, but the Part II examples (the 
mashup DJ’s remix, the emo artist’s derivative works) were created 
for some, though not a lot of, profit. Fair use tends to favor uses that 
don’t harm the market for or value of the original, but the owners in 
each of the Part II examples can cook up an argument that the uses 
                                                
155 Judges love remarking on fair use’s indeterminacy as well, and have for 
some time. E.g., Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1929) 
(describing fair use, even before its codification, as “the most troublesome doctrine 
in the whole of copyright law”).  
156 17 U.S.C. sec. 505 (authorizing judgments of up to $150,000 in statutory 
damages for a single act of willful infringement). 
157 At least, that is, users who are aware of their infringement. Many lay 
consumptive users may not be aware of the countless ways in which they infringe 
copyright. For an entertaining summary of how common infringement is in daily 
life, see generally JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND 
YOU (2011). 
158 See David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139 
(2009) (arguing that fair use’s vagueness tends to deter reasonably risk-averse users). 
159 Jim Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2005) 
(discussing how the vagueness of fair use in combination with high copyright 
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could theoretically (even if not in fact) been licensed.160 Finally, none 
of the uses in Part II’s examples counts as a parody, the category that 
many judges have come to treat as per-se fair use. The closest case is 
the appropriation artist’s collage, but that work seeks to mock not the 
infringed work, but some other subject, which makes the use a satire—
a category of work that has grown so disfavored by courts as to be per 
se unfair.161 And while there remains a colorable argument that these 
uses might be fair, the cases are close enough that a reasonably risk-
averse user would likely not want to risk infringement damages, and 
would thus avoid the uses outright. 
 
 Fair use, though, represents only one aspect of the Copyright 
Act’s available defenses for unauthorized use. On the other end of the 
spectrum from fair use’s capaciousness are the many narrowly drawn 
use exceptions of which Section 110 furnishes a useful illustration. 
Section 110 immunizes from liability, among other things, public 
performances of copyrighted works made for in-person education,162 
of nondramatic musical or literary works in the course of religious 
services,163 or within certain small-scale commercial establishments.164 
As these few examples illustrate, these granular exemptions exhibit 
just the opposite problem of fair use. While they are specific enough to 
raise few questions as to the scope of their applicability, their 
narrowness provides only a small, targeted range of protected uses. 
                                                
160 Indeed, courts tend to base factor four analyses primarily on the theoretical 
availability of licensing, not the actual existence of a properly functioning licensing 
market. Compare Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.2d 913, 929-31 (2d Cir. 
1995) (finding that photocopies of scientific journal articles were not fair use 
because a new mechanism for licensing photocopies existed) with id. at 936-39 
(Jacobs, J., dissenting) (observing that the purported licensing scheme was so 
imperfect that it did not provide a meaningful opportunity to acquire a valid license). 
161 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books, U.S.A., Inc., 109 F. 3d 1394 
(9th Cir. 1997). Courts typically cite Acuff-Rose for the proposition that satire is per 
se not fair use, e.g., id. at 1400 (quoting Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580), but this 
reading is doubly mistaken. First, the Acuff-Rose Court said only that parody is more 
likely to be fair use than satire, not that the latter can never be fair use. 510 U.S. 580-
81. Second, the parody/satire distinction is only relevant to factor one analysis, so 
even if a use’s status as satire causes a single factor to weigh in favor of 
infringement, that does not mean the other three factors could not on-balance result 
in a finding of fair use. 
162 17 U.S.C. sec. 110(1). 
163 Id. sec. 110(3). 
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 As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the failure of current 
law to account for efficient copyright infringement can be 
disaggregated into two types of shortcomings: scope and coherence. 
Fair use’s scope causes it to match weakly with efficient infringement. 
This breadth has had the ironic result of causing judges to narrow the 
doctrine in their search for a single determinate fair use touchstone. 
The doctrine’s vagueness has also led risk-averse users to be ever 
charier of unauthorized use in the face of some possibility of massive 
liability. By contrast, the scope of the Copyright Act’s other 
exemptions is simply too narrow to capture the full range of efficient, 
but unauthorized, uses. This narrowness is unsurprising since many—
perhaps most—of the exemptions in section 110 and elsewhere in Title 
17 are the products of legislative compromise and interest-group 
pressure rather than a thoughtful balancing of private and public 
interests.165 
 
And while their failings in terms of scope are different, each of 
these sections shares a similar lack of coherence in terms of what 
kinds of uses it prefers to permit, and under what conditions it seeks to 
permit them. Fair use’s variety of factors do not give a coherent vision 
of the kind of unauthorized uses that merit exemption, while a 
different kind of mismatch—one that is too focused, rather than 
sprawling—results from the disconnected, granular exemptions 
scattered throughout the rest of the Copyright Act. Nor do any of these 
exemptions completely account for the possibility that even welfare-
enhancing unauthorized uses may create even more welfare if the user 
simply purchases a license. Some well-capitalized fair users or 
business owners may be perfectly able to pay for a license to use a 
copyrighted work, though they need not under section 107 or 110. The 
ensuing section seeks to imagine what it might mean for law to exhibit 
more fidelity to efficient copyright infringement along the axes of both 
scope and coherence. 
                                                
165 For example, when film producers brought a legal challenge against 
“CleanFlicks” DVD players that automatically expunged adult-themed aspects of 
films during home playback. Congress responded to pressure from the religious right 
to pass an amendment to the Copyright Act specifically to immunize CleanFlicks 
technology from infringement liability. See 17 U.S.C. sec. 110(11) (“CleanFlicks” 
exemption). See also generally LITMAN, supra note 35 (paperback ed. 2006) 
(discussing the massive influence of lobbying groups, especially content industries, 
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 B. Imagining a law of efficient copyright 
 infringement  
 
 Part III.A’s discussion of the Copyright Act’s shortcomings 
does two things. First, it highlights the continued need for law to better 
account for efficient copyright infringement, despite the presence of 
doctrines that make some effort along those lines. And second, it helps 
frame how law should (and should not) seek to address this problem. 
Part III.B seeks to start a discussion along those lines. The goal of this 
Subpart is not (and, given space constraints and law’s inevitable 
imperfections, cannot be) to produce a silver-bullet legislative 
proposal that will tolerate all unauthorized uses that are welfare-
enhancing while excluding those that are not. Rather, it seeks to 
develop a conceptual sketch rather than a detailed blueprint of the first 
steps and core principles law might take in creating a doctrine of 
efficient copyright infringement. The Subpart takes the form of a 
thought experiment that asks how copyright remedies might be 
modified to make infringement more efficient, and explores three 
different answers. 
 
  1. Eliminating Statutory Damages and Infringer’s 
   Profits 
 
 As discussed earlier, one of the features that currently prevents 
copyright’s remedies system from approaching efficient breach in 
contract is the variety of monetary damages available to prevailing 
plaintiffs. Owners who successfully show that their work has been 
infringed are entitled not only to recover their expected losses (actual 
damages) but, alternatively, the defendant’s profits or statutory 
damages.166 The first option for enabling efficient infringement, then, 
is a relatively simple statutory fix: Eliminate defendant’s profits and 
statutory damages as remedies for copyright infringement.  
 
 A quick example illustrates how this would change—and 
possibly make more socially beneficial—the infringement calculus. 
Under current law, a user who wants to make a use of a copyrighted 
work of authorship that will earn $100,000 in profit, but who cannot 
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secure a license, will forego that use due to the threat of infringement 
liability. Losing an infringement suit would subject him to at least a 
complete loss of any profits, and as much as $150,000 in statutory 
damages (if the work is registered and a judge regards it as willful 
infringement). But in a world without infringer’s profits and statutory 
damages as remedies, prevailing plaintiffs would be able to recover 
only the amount they actually lost due to infringement. Here, that 
would likely amount to the cost typically charged for a reasonable 
royalty. It is certainly possible that the owner might have expected a 
royalty of over $100,000 for this use,167 but in that case, the user 
would have been wise to forego the losses associated with the project 
in any event. 
 
 The appeal of eliminating infringer’s profits and statutory 
damages is that it more closely calibrates recoveries in infringement 
suits to the actual costs to owners—hence plaintiff’s losses are often 
referred to as “actual damages” even under current law.168 It also 
eliminates the ability of owners to threaten small-scale users with 
massive statutory damages awards in order to force settlements that 
bear no proportion to the actual social cost inflicted by infringement. 
The practice of “copyright trolling,” most famously implemented in 
recent years by Righthaven, could not exist unless owners (and their 
agents) could intimidate bloggers and other inadvertent, small-scale 
infringers with the possibility that they might suffer a six-figure 
damages award if they did not settle.169 Limiting copyright’s monetary 
remedies to a plaintiff’s actual damages would cause those remedies to 
track the basic model of recovery in other property tort cases: you 
recover the costs that the defendant’s injury inflicted on you. It would 
also allow productive users would be allowed to keep any social value 
they created, providing a valuable incentive for such uses.170 For their 
                                                
167 Film option rights for a highly successful novel, for example, may well 
exceed this amount. 
168 Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 
2008) (using “actual damages” synonymously with “plaintiff’s losses”). 
169 See Kurt Opsahl, Facing Down a Copyright Troll in Federal Court, 
Wired.com, Feb. 6, 2013, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/02/facing-down-copyright-troll-federal-appeals-
court. 
170 And it might provide a valuable incentive for owners of works to engage in 
more productive uses themselves, rather than waiting for someone else to do it and 





 Efficient Copyright Infringement 55 
part, owners would to seek recovery for infringement only where 
filing suit turned out to be a value-positive proposition for them, 
eliminating the possibility of recoveries out of all proportion with the 
actual costs of infringement.171  
 
 This alternative sounds appealing where we assume either that 
the use at issue is so socially productive that its deterrence by statutory 
damages is inefficient, or where it is so trivial that imposing up to six 
figures in statutory damages seems to give owners a windfall as well 
as disproportionate bargaining power. But flipping the infringement 
script in this manner may place owners, rather than users, in a position 
of weakness, with possible deleterious effects. For one thing, 
eliminating statutory damages and infringer’s profits as damages 
options essentially converts copyright from a property rule regime to a 
liability rule regime. Users would be free to engage in unauthorized 
exercise of owners’ exclusive rights so long as they pay a court-
imposed royalty down the road. This would have the concerning effect 
of essentially stripping from owners any control over their work.172 
Publishers could print unauthorized copies of their competitors’ 
works, recording companies could release their competitors’ sound 
recordings, and movie theaters could show whatever films they 
wanted—all subject only to the possibility that they might be forced to 
pay the fair royalty they would have owed anyway.173  
 
 Two more issues further complicate the story of this 
approach’s appeal. For one thing, limiting copyright damages to 
plaintiff’s losses may have the perverse effect of driving up the costs 
of licensing considerably. Since a primary measure of actual damages 
is an owner’s lost royalties,174 owners would have a strong incentive to 
                                                
171 E.g., Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 
2010) (reducing statutory damages award against defendant who illegally shared 24 
sound recordings via p2p network from $1.9 million to $54,000, and explaining that 
the former amount of damages was “monstrous and shocking” as well as a “gross 
injustice” when compared to the actual gravity of the infringement). 
172 It would also eliminate the “intended deterrent effect” of statutory damages 
that the Copyright Act’s framers intended. H.R. Rep. 94-1476 at 163. 
173 Although these unambiguous case of infringement would almost certainly 
likely result in a favorable judgment, it’s not certain that an owner would seek 
damages, especially in light of the high costs of enforcing suits. 
174 See Gaylord v. U.S., 678 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“When … the 
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raise the costs of the royalties they actually charge so that they can 
credibly claim high actual damages in the event that they prevail in an 
infringement action. And the cost and uncertainty associated with 
litigation would mean that actual damages would never truly fully 
compensate prevailing owners. This concern is especially salient with 
respect to smaller-scale infringement. Consider a record label’s 
position with respect to Limewire users who download even several 
hundred tracks. Suing and winning against such users would net actual 
damages only in the amount of the reasonable royalties the users 
should have paid, which would total at most around $1000 even in the 
case of high-volume unauthorized downloading. That recovery would 
hardly justify the time and trouble of litigation, even if the user (as the 
losing party) bore the record company’s attorney’s fees.   
 
 One final factor that remains to consider when evaluating the 
potential impact of limiting copyright damages is the role of non-
monetary remedies, particularly injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. 
Retaining these remedies might rein in the specter of an infringement 
free-for-all in a world without statutory damages. The presence of 
injunctive relief and attorney’s fees may deter rampant infringement 
even absent statutory damages, considering that even small-scale users 
could face massive adverse fee awards even if the actual damages they 
owed to the prevailing plaintiff were low. The presence of injunctive 
relief, though, may undercut the capacity of this revision to enable an 
efficient infringement regime. Getting rid of statutory damages might 
limit the financial impact of adverse judgments on those who made 
highly productive and socially valuable unauthorized uses of works of 
authorship. But if owners could permanently enjoin the future 
exploitation of the work, then both the user and the public would be 
deprived of the value created by the unauthorized use. 
 
 2. Expanding statutory safe harbors 
 
As discussed above, the Copyright Act creates some 
affirmative defenses for otherwise infringing conduct. While one is 
highly general (fair use), most are targeted to particular kinds of uses 
(e.g., first sale, section 110). Another possible way to facilitate 
efficient copyright infringement may be to create more general 
                                                                                                               
value of the copyright, many circuits award actual damages based on the fair market 
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statutory safe harbors that, like fair use, immunize broad swaths of 
otherwise infringing use from liability. For example, Congress could 
amend the Copyright Act to include an affirmative defense to 
infringement where search costs associated with licensing a work are 
particularly high. Take, for instance, the search-costs problem of 
“orphan works.” These are works that bear no indicia of authorship, 
forcing would-be users to either forgo using the work or risking 
possibly immense damages. Legislation was proposed years ago to 
remedy the this concern. The proposed bill (which never got out of 
committee) would have limited the infringement damages available to 
plaintiffs where defendants “performed and documented a reasonably 
diligent search in good faith to locate the owner of the infringed 
copyright,” but were “unable to locate the owner.”175   
 
We can imagine other statutory safe harbors that sweep even 
more broadly and address some of the other efficient infringement 
scenarios discussed in the previous Part. The Copyright Act could 
broadly immunize from liability infringement that is necessary to 
exercise rights under the Speech Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s 
First Amendment. A statutory provision could also create a safe harbor 
for uses where owners’ enforcement is contrary to the constitutional 
aspirations expressed in the Progress Clause. These latter two 
examples already have some presence in copyright law. In Eldred, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the tension between the First 
Amendment and copyright, and raised the possibility that laws 
enhancing owners’ rights could run afoul of the First Amendment’s 
Speech Clause if they do not alter “traditional contours of copyright 
protection.”176 And courts have adapted the common law defense of 
estoppel to into a copyright misuse doctrine. On this theory, owners 
are precluded from enforcing their exclusive rights where the exercise 
of those rights undermines other policies of the law, such as antitrust 
or—in one case—the Progress Clause’s policies of promoting creative 
and inventive expression.177 Codifying these free-floating notions in 
                                                
175 Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439 sec. 514(a)(1)(A) (proposed May 22, 
2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.5439. 
176 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 
177 Assessment Techs. of Wis., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 
2003); Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (refusing to 
enforce a copyright where its owner aimed to undermine copyright’s policy of 
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the Copyright Act would bring stability and certainty to an otherwise 
open-ended doctrine. Courts have thus far only hinted at defenses to 
infringement based on the Speech Clause or copyright misuse on a 
Progress Clause theory.178 Writing these doctrines into federal law 
would replace common-law judicial hesitance with a strong, clear 
affirmance of the vitality of these defenses. Codification may also 
provide a focal point for litigants, encouraging defenses on Speech or 
Progress Clause theories that defendants have thus far hesitated to take 
seriously in light of courts’ ambivalence about them.179 
 
Several concerns accompany the promise of codifying users’ 
safe harbors in the interest of facilitating efficient copyright 
infringement. The values of the Speech and Progress Clauses are 
drawn at such a high level of generality that merely stating the 
availability of these defenses would give judges and litigants little 
guidance about how they should play out in specific cases. And even if 
judges were able to craft limiting and clarifying principles that 
provided some determinacy to these defenses, risk-averse users may 
well steer clear of invoking them given the high costs of litigation and 
liability. Just as with a use that is likely but not certainly fair, a use 
that is likely but not certainly within a constitutional safe harbor 
carries with it a risk of damages so high that it may deter the use 
altogether.  
 
And safe harbors that entirely immunize users from 
infringement liability fall short of effecting efficient infringement also 
because owners receive no recompense for the role their work played 
in the success of a use. Efficient breach is attractive because neither 
promisees nor promisors lose the benefit of the bargain. But statutory 
safe harbors mean that owners lose completely because they get no 
                                                
178 Indeed, the Court seems to have cabined the notion of a Speech Clause 
defense to copyright expansions significantly in Golan v. Holder, holding that 
copyright laws cannot violate speech rights given the presence of speech safeguards 
like fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy. 132 S. Ct. 873, 890-91 & n.30 
(2012). And there is as yet just a single federal court decision precluding an owner’s 
enforcement of their copyright on the theory that it violates copyright’s pro-
dissemination and –creation policies. Schloss, supra note 177. 
179 This was the case with the fair use defense, which existed as a general 
common law doctrine prior to its codification in the 1976 Act. See generally Richard 
McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000) 
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royalties, while users get the entire value of the work as an input for 
free. This outcome may work when the use is a necessary incident to a 
constitutional right, since we typically think of rights as trumping 
countervailing economic considerations. But as a matter of balancing 
owners’ and users’ concerns, statutory safe harbors (whether fair use 
or the ones suggested in this Subpart) may stack the deck too strongly 
in the latter direction. 
 
3. Ex post compulsory licenses for productive uses 
 
This Subpart concludes by exploring a final doctrinal option 
for implementing efficient copyright infringement: ex post compulsory 
licenses. Current law makes unauthorized use an all or nothing 
gamble. If a given unpermitted exercise of an owner’s rights in their 
work is fair, then users are permitted to engage in the use, free of 
charge. But if that use is not fair, and not otherwise subject to an 
affirmative defense, then users face the Copyright Act’s full arsenal of 
remedies, including six-figure statutory damages for willful 
infringement. Compulsory licenses provide a way to mediate between 
these two extremes, by allowing users to exploit works of authorship 
without owners’ permission, while still requiring that they pay owners 
for the privilege.180 
  
The primary knock on compulsory licenses is that ex ante 
ratesetting tends to correlate weakly at best with the real value of the 
owner’s work as an input to the use. Such licenses will almost always 
overvalue, or (more plausibly) undervalue the use of the owner’s work 
in the context of the new use.181 Consider, by contrast, how an ex post 
compulsory license would work. Such a license would not fix 
beforehand a rate for a given use. Instead, it would assess the value of 
the license after the use, based on the profit earned by the 
unauthorized use. Consider a simple example: The Copyright Act 
could allow users to make new works of authorship based on 
                                                
180 See Alex Kozinski & Chris Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use? 36 J. 
Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 167 (1999) (proposing ex ante compulsory licenses for 
derivative works). 
181 For example, the Copyright Act permits users to make cover versions of 
musical works so long as they remit a royalty of a mere 9.1 cents per copy of each 
cover sold to the musical work owner. 17 U.S.C. sec. 115; see U.S. Copyright 
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preexisting works, pursuant to a requirement that the users remit to the 
preexisting work’s owner a 10% royalty share of all sales and 
licensing fees from the new work.182  
 
The advantages of this approach are several. Unlike existing 
(and proposed) statutory safe harbors, it does not create a winner-take-
all game. Rather, it permits users to freely create follow-on works 
based on existing, copyrighted works of authorship, but it assures that 
owners of those preexisting works will receive some recompense for 
the role their work played in the new one. If the new work is a 
blockbuster (e.g., a highly successful cover version of a previously 
obscure musical work), this would be a windfall for the owner—they 
would get 10% of the copy sales and licensing fees thanks to another 
person’s creative efforts. But if the follow-on work is not for profit 
(e.g., fan fiction based on a TV show), the user need not worry about a 
crippling infringement judgment, and the owner would likely not have 
lost out on a meaningful license fee anyway.183 Moreover, unlike 
simply getting rid of statutory damages and infringer’s profits, an ex 
post compulsory license would not require owners to bear the costs 
and uncertainty of litigation in order to recover what users owed them. 
And finally, an ex post compulsory license (unlike an ex ante one) 
would not function as a mere price ceiling for unauthorized use. 
Rather, it would provide a guaranteed royalty stream to owners, so that 
as new works resulting from productive uses earned more money, so 
would the owner of the underlying work. 
 
Ex post compulsory licenses do come with their own unique 
set of concerns, though. The most obvious question is how the process 
of ratesetting and compensation would be administered. The most 
immediate answer is that all of these functions could be carried out 
with existing administrative apparatus, such as the Copyright Office 
                                                
182 This approach has an analog in physical property law, where wrongful 
possessors are sometimes allowed to retain title to their improvements provided that 
they pay the owner for the cost of the input. See Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 
312 (1871) (allowing a good-faith improver of chattel property to keep the resulting 
goods on the condition that he reimburse the owner for the initial value of the 
chattels); but see Cal. Civ. Code Ann. sec. 1007 (entitling adverse possessors to take 
title to real property without compensating the owner). 
183 See Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 1019-29 (1997) (contrasting the economic value of minor, 
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(for regulatory guidance) and the Copyright Royalty Board (for setting 
rates). And as with other large-scale licensing endeavors, private 
organizations could spring up to more efficiently handle the interface 
between users and owners.184 A corollary problem is what kind of uses 
would be subject to the compulsory license. A practical limit on this 
could be to make only productive uses, such as where a user creates a 
new work based on actual incorporation of a preexisting work, subject 
to the ex post compulsory licensing regime. Such an approach would 
provide a cognizable limit to the scope of works affected by this 
regime, but it would inevitably be to some extent underinclusive. It 
would not compensate owners whose works strongly influence, even if 
they are not incorporated directly into, a new work. Nor would it 
include in its scope the many users who make socially valuable 
verbatim reproductions of works, such as interoperative devices like 
DVRs or archives like Google Books. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 This Part has explored efficient copyright infringement along 
two dimensions: How current law accounts for this notion, and how it 
might do so more effectively. There are elements of the Copyright Act 
that seek to tolerate socially beneficial infringement, but they tend to 
be undone by their perceived doctrinal vagueness or their substantive 
underinclusiveness. How might law craft remedies to better reflect 
efficient copyright infringement? This Part answered that question 
with a thought experiment rather than a single proposal. The simplest 
fix might be to simply eliminate all monetary remedies other than 
plaintiff’s damages, effectively converting copyright into a liability 
rule rather than a property rule regime. Or, Congress could add more 
statutory safe harbors like fair use, immunizing from liability 
otherwise infringing conduct that is associated with high transaction 
costs, free speech rights, or owner conduct that undermines the 
aspirations of the Progress Clause. Finally, ex post compulsory 
licenses would require more administrative apparatus, but would 
produce a close fit between owners’ and users’ interests in the case of 
                                                
184 For example, most section 115 compulsory licenses for mechanical 
reproductions of musical works in phonorecords are administered privately by the 
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productive unauthorized use. Nor are these schemes mutually 
exclusive. The best approach might be to draw from each of them. 
 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND EFFICIENT INFRINGEMENT 
 
 Efficient copyright infringement is at once counterintuitive and 
intuitive, familiar and foreign. That copyright infringement can be 
efficient challenges our instincts about the wrongfulness of 
unauthorized use of property—instincts that transcend, if imperfectly, 
the distinction between tangible and intangible property. Popular 
culture casts infringers as villains—ruinous “pirates” in the common 
parlance of IP rhetoric—whose transgressions against owners threaten 
to deprive them of hard-earned and well-deserved economic 
remuneration.185 This reaction derives at least in part from a strong 
moral instinct that begins from the intuition that unauthorized use of 
another’s intellectual property is intrinsically wrong, and proceeds to 
conclude that such wrongful behavior must be socially destructive.186 
Neither Madison’s happy account of public/private interest 
convergence, nor our innate sense that property should remain 
inviolate seem to leave any room for the notion that copyright 
infringement might do good rather than ill. 
 
Yet while our instincts may reject efficient copyright 
infringement at a high level of generality, they can embrace it in 
particular instances. Consider, for example, the uniformly outraged 
reaction when ASCAP sought to make the Girl Scouts of America pay 
royalties for singing campfire songs.187 A similar reaction 
accompanied Diebold’s attempt to use copyright to suppress public 
exposure of internal memos detailing its involvement in election 
                                                
185 See David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 652, 666-67 (2010) (observing that popular-cultural critics have derided 
infringers as pirates and communists, and have suggested that their conduct is 
sacrilegious). 
186 See Haidt, supra note 51 (summarizing studies showing that actors who have 
negative moral instincts to conduct strongly tend to assume that the conduct must be 
socially costly, even when told otherwise). 
187 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Ascap Asks Royalties From Girl Scouts, and Regrets 
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fraud.188 And while content industries railed against (and still express 
understandable concern about) unauthorized filesharing on p2p 
platforms, some users celebrated the conduct as an important, 
rebellious social statement.189 Here, and in numerous other cases, 
intuitive popular sentiment ran in favor of infringement. Many factors 
underlie these reactions. They may have derived from instinctive 
distaste for corporate-monolith copyright owners or a dislike of 
aggressive enforcement tactics against apparently innocuous groups. 
But these reactions are explicable at least in part also because the 
owners seem to be suppressing prosocial, if unauthorized, uses of their 
works. We may reject efficient copyright infringement as an idea, but 
we know it when we see it—and often, we like it—in practice. 
 
 This divergence may be explained in part by the unfamiliarity 
of efficient copyright infringement as an available social trope. Search 
Google for the phrase and you’ll get less than a full page of hits—most 
of which refer to p2p filesharing devices that are “efficient copyright 
infringement machines.”190 The term has never been invoked by 
federal courts and shows up exactly once in law reviews, again in the 
context of an entirely unrelated usage.191 So perhaps the instinctive 
resistance to efficient copyright infringement simply derives from the 
unavailability of this idea in our cultural discourse. And yet here too, 
the unfamiliarity of this idea as a social notion is belied by the 
numerous instances in which we tolerate and even champion particular 
instances of unauthorized use because they enhance social welfare. 
Fair use may be vague and underinclusive, but courts still sometimes 
rely on it to save unauthorized users from massive infringement 
                                                
188 See PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 12 (discussing negative public 
reaction to Diebold’s aggressive enforcement of its copyright in an attempt to keep 
its internal memos secret). 
189 Cf. PENALVER & KATYAL, supra note 12 (discussing social support for 
unauthorized filesharing via p2p platforms, and suggesting that such conduct has at 
least some socially positive effects in terms of signaling changing social norms about 
the appropriate scope of copyright protection). 
190 The rest of which are references to this paper. 
191 Based on Westlaw and SSRN searches performed August 7, 2012, the only 
use of the term “efficient copyright infringement” appears in Tiffany A. Parcher, 
Comment, The Fact and Fiction of Grokster and Sony: Using Factual Comparisons 
to Uncover the Legal Rule, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 509 (2006) (“How much can 
warnings, disclaimers, and alert windows indicate good ethics when they accompany 
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verdicts.192 And scholars may not have articulated a general theory of 
efficient copyright infringement, but much recent work in the field 
identifies and defends particular instances of unauthorized use,193 and 
critiques the market failure that prevents the copyright system from 
realizing the maximum level of cultural production.194 
 
 This Article has sought to resolve these tensions, and to 
synthesize disparate related strands in the literature, by articulating a 
novel, unified theory of efficient copyright infringement in three steps. 
The necessity of articulating this notion at all flows from the premise 
that it is impossible to know how to set owners’ exclusive rights at 
precisely the level that will optimize cultural production. For this 
reason, some tolerated theft will always be necessary to reach the 
goals of the copyright system. Especially because the political 
economy of copyright skews so strongly in favor of owners, a dialogue 
that seeks this balance must attend closely to the interests of users, and 
the public. Describing the domain of socially desirable unauthorized 
use is relatively straightforward. Where private ordering for acquiring 
a use license proves unavailable or undesirable, and the use is welfare-
enhancing, copyright infringement will be efficient. Translating these 
ideas into doctrine is challenging, and this Article has sought to 
explore that issue by means of a thought experiment that imagines 
how different kinds of remedial modifications—limiting actual and 
statutory damages, creating doctrinal safe harbors, and establishing ex 
post compulsory licenses—might make the infringement regime more 
consonant with copyright’s constitutional aspirations. 
 
 As the foregoing indicates, this Article’s aspiration is both 
descriptive and normative. But its normative goals extend beyond 
those articulated in Part III. Introducing efficient copyright 
infringement matters not only for how we govern ownership in works 
of authorship, but for social dialogue about the appropriate scope and 
                                                
192 For a very recent example, see Northland Family Planning Clinic, Inc. v. 
Center for Bio-ethical Reform, (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2012) (finding anti-abortion 
group’s use of family planning clinic’s advertising materials to be fair, albeit almost 
entirely on the ground that they were parody not satire).  
193 E.g., Litman, supra note 10 (articulating a theory of lawful personal use); 
Tushnet, supra note 134 (elaborating the social utility created by numerous kinds of 
verbatim copying). 
194 See Gordon, Market Failure, supra note 71; Gordon, Excuse and 
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scale of copyright protection. As we have seen, violations of property 
rights in general, and of copyright in particular, often trigger in owners 
powerful moral reactions out of all proportion with the social costs a 
given unauthorized entry (or use) may actually inflict.195 At the same 
time, the shared human tendency toward strong self-interest leads 
concentrated, wealthy content industries to lobby Congress—with 
consistent success—for expansion of owners’ rights. And the absence 
of a well-articulated notion of efficient copyright infringement from 
black letter law and political discourse exacerbates these tendencies. 
Merely outlining the contours of efficient copyright infringement may 
help to check the uncritical expansion of owners’ rights by calling 
attention to efficient copyright infringement as a unified idea, and by 
pushing back against the notion that all infringement amounts to 
socially pernicious piracy. 
 
This Article has sought to illustrate the underappreciated social 
value of copyright infringement. In so doing, it has accepted the 
foundational assumption that has animated American copyright law 
since 1790: Exclusive rights in works of authorship, properly 
calibrated, will optimize creative production.196 While judges and 
scholars may disagree about the appropriate way to construct this 
property-like approach to motivating creation, there is general 
acceptance that some degree of exclusive rights is necessary to 
motivate authors and to protect their works.197 Yet recent work 
increasingly casts doubt on the assumption that exclusive rights are the 
only, or even the best, way to encourage creation and invention. 
Numerous creative industries—such as fashion, cuisine, and stand-up 
comedy—thrive in the absence of copyright protection, either because 
                                                
195 See Fagundes, supra note 185 (discussing property’s capacity to elicit 
disproportionately strong moral reactions among laypeople). 
196 The sole focus on this exclusive-rights approach to incentivizing creative 
production is understandable in light of the Constitution’s Progress Clause, which 
makes “exclusive Right[s]” in works of authorship and inventions the means by 
which Congress may promote “Progress of Science and Useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
197 See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond 
Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970 (2012) (discussing and 
critiquing “IP internalism”: the notion that property like systems are necessary or 
optimal ways to motivate creative production); see e.g., PENALVER & KATYAL, 
supra note 12 (highlighting the importance of “altlaws” only as a relatively narrow 
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social norms take the place of state-created law, or because 
unauthorized copying actually furthers creative production.198 And 
there are plausible alternatives to property-like systems that may 
promise better ways to motivate creation and invention, such as 
commons-based production and government procurement.199  
 
This Article’s discussion of the prevalence of efficient 
copyright infringement may pose similar questions about the necessity 
of the IP regime. If much of what we regard as infringement is socially 
beneficial, this may lead us to question whether it makes any sense to 
have a system that seeks to penalize and deter such conduct.200 This, 
then, is the final and perhaps most counterintuitive implication of this 
Article: That by introducing into legal and social discourse a notion of 
efficient copyright infringement, we may come to question the wisdom 
of the copyright infringement system itself. 
                                                
198 RAUSTIALA & SPRIGMAN, supra note 64(enumerating several examples of 
creative industries that are thriving despite—or perhaps because of—the absence of 
copyright protection). 
199 Kapczynksi, supra note 197 (discussing these alternatives to exclusive IP 
rights and arguing that they may be superior). 
200 A more modest version of this inquiry would be whether it makes sense to 
have exclusive rights be the dominant approach to IP production. One could imagine 
a tiered system where high-production cost entertainment goods like blockbuster 
movies retain the exclusive rights they need to exist, while experimental or smaller-
scale works would be created outside the scope of the IP system. 
